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This work addresses the effectiveness of energy efficiency (EE) incentive programs in 
reducing electricity consumption and assisting states in meeting their energy policy 
goals. EE programs provide financial incentives to encourage consumers to make 
investments in energy efficient equipment and reduce energy consumption. This study 
carries out a quantitative analysis to provide insights into EE programs performance. 
In two empirical applications, the research examines program performance on two 
levels: national coverage including all US-based utilities in the first application and 
state performance in the second application.  
The first empirical application examines stipulated energy savings from electric utilities 
across all states and compares the outcome to an econometric model that estimates 
savings from observed consumption. This study examines panel data from the 
contiguous US spanning eleven years from 2005 to 2015, to estimate the effect of EE 
program total expenditures on electricity demand. We find that although EE investments 
have been effective in reducing energy consumption, the modeled magnitude of these 
energy savings implies that EE programs have had a smaller effect on energy 
consumption than claimed by electric utilities over the same period. 
The results imply a price elasticity of energy efficiency ranging between 0.29 - 0.54; 
indicating a rebound effect. Consequentially, energy savings are less than proportional 
to the increase in energy efficiency. However, consumers benefit from an increase in 




The second empirical application examines the cost-effectiveness of state-specific EE 
programs. The application employs econometric analysis to mimic an experimental 
research design using observational data from states with different energy policies in 
EE investments. This methodology evaluates program performance between states with 
aggressive EE policies and states with moderate programs. The differential effect of EE 
program implementation (treatment) in those states is examined in the context of a 
difference in differences approach and synthetic control method. The study examines 
the performance of the state with the highest per capita investments in EE: the state of 
Rhode Island. 
We assessed the energy efficiency policy of Rhode Island and compared its outcome to 
Maine and New Hampshire. Findings suggest that there is not a statistically significant 
effect on residential consumption, as a result of the substantial increase in EE 
expenditure, in RI during the period 2008 to 2015. However, a re-evaluation of the 
Rhode Island EE policy, using the synthetic control method (SCM) identifies that by 
the year 2015, annual per-consumer residential electricity consumption in Rhode 
Island was 97 kWh (1.34%) lower, on average, than it would have been in the absence 
of the increased EE programs.  
The research also identifies that energy efficiency improvements have welfare 
implications on various levels: individual, local, national and international. The 
outcomes from improvements in energy efficiency are not limited to energy savings but 
influence a wide range of benefits such as job creation and improved living conditions.  
Finally, the research provides insights by comparing the levelized costs of energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. We find that the cost of renewable energy production 
 
 
is now very close to the cost of reducing energy use through energy efficiency programs.  
Continuing downward trends in the cost of renewable energy technologies such as solar 
and wind may suggest a change in the priorities of states energy incentive programs in 
the near future. 
However, it is important to note that this comparison only includes the financial cost, 
and does not consider the full social cost.  For example, this comparison does not 
consider other social costs, such as aesthetic effects of large-scale solar energy 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The heated debate on climate change has led to an increase in environmental research 
and the creation of more environmental policies. In recent years, there has been a 
growing interest in the literature on energy efficiency (EE). The objective of this 
research is to evaluate the effectiveness of EE programs, specifically those that provide 
financial incentives to reduce electric energy consumption. The discussion is no longer 
solely centered on the scarcity of natural resources for traditional energy production. 
The drive for energy efficiency programs and sustainable economic development has 
been an energy policy goal in the US, since President Carter’s administration. However, 
technological innovations, which were expected to overcome obstacles to future growth 
and economic progress, have not been able to keep up with the ever-increasing demand 
for energy. The increase in energy consumption, driven primarily by population growth 
and increased global wealth, is correlated with rising average atmospheric temperatures.  
This has become the center of one of today’s most complex problems. Environmental 
economists today are facing the challenge of using economic theory not only as a tool 
to explain and understand the utilization of natural resources but as a means to shape a 
new relationship between the economy and the environment.  
As early as 1975, Wally Broecker, in the Journal of Science, forewarned: “Are we on 
the brink of a pronounced global warming?” (Broecker, 1975). Four decades later, the 
correlation between carbon emissions and the dangers of global temperature rise, has 
increased the international concerns. For example, the UN decided to take action in the 
form of a global climate conference. Specifically, at the 2015 United Nations Climate 
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Change Conference in Paris, nations agreed to a drastic reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions in order to limit global temperature increase. The global climate governance 
signatories to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change acknowledged the 
problem and demanded action. Their actions were driven by good intentions translated 
into a new set of universal goals, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) promoting 
energy efficiency and renewable energy programs. However, efficiency and renewable 
energy programs require the implementation of energy policies, and their effectiveness 
is a subject of controversial debate. Criticism includes the selection bias issue that 
reduces the effectiveness of the programs. At the same time, an increase in energy 
consumption as a result of the implementation of the programs leads to overestimates 
of the energy savings. This topic is examined analytically and described in the research 
as the rebound effect. 
The target proposed by the climate summit in Paris introduced policies to hold “the 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-
industrial levels" (COP21, 2015). An adjustment of this magnitude requires the 
immediate reduction of carbon output. That would translate into immediate and drastic 
technological adjustments via a binding and universal agreement by all nations of the 
world on specific climate-related policies. In practice, the only two available options to 
achieve such an outcome would be a decrease in the overall demand for energy or the 
increase in the supply of clean energy, free of greenhouse gas emissions. Governments 
around the world have adopted both solutions in varying analogies in the hope of 
curbing carbon emissions. The first option, a decrease in energy consumption via 
practices and technologies that allow us to maintain the same level of service, is referred 
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in the bibliography as energy efficiency (EE). A typical example of an EE program is 
the offer of rebates by utilities to consumers to encourage investments in new EE 
technologies and equipment. EE incentive policies have a broad scope and consist of 
specific programs like those that target electricity consumption, natural gas and 
deliverable fuels (oil, propane). This research focuses on electricity incentive programs.   
Currently, policymakers and stakeholders focus on adopting incentive programs to 
increase investments in EE. They are hoping that the actual effect of EE programs in 
reducing electricity consumption will indeed have a positive effect in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. The relationship between funds spent on EE investments and 
corresponding electricity savings is critical because we are unable to make the necessary 
technological improvements in the short-term. For the examined period, 2005-2015, 
state policymakers have increasingly encouraged utilities to invest public funds in 
financial incentives for EE. The annual expense for the year 2015 was more than double 
the annual expenditure five years earlier. This trend seems to continue unimpeded; 
therefore, questions about the duration and effectiveness of the programs ought to be 
examined. In 2015, the total spending for energy efficiency from electricity utility 
incentive programs was $5.7 billion (Table 7: Annual Costs of Electricity Efficiency 
Program Implementation) (EIA, 2015). 
The relationship between actual funds spent in the form of incentives on EE 
investments, and the corresponding electricity savings, has not been fully researched 
and documented. Policymakers adopt energy efficiency incentive programs because 
they are thought to be effective. They are driven by energy policy stemming from public 
opinion and the scientific data on global warming. The idea is that the marginal cost of 
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increasing energy efficiency is less than the marginal cost of producing additional 
energy. Acceptance of the concept that EE programs are essential drivers for cost-
effective energy conservation has created a framework where subsidies for EE have 
been viewed as an appropriate key strategy. For that reason, states compete to achieve 
energy savings by increasing their spending for EE programs each year. This is an 
analogical reasoning understanding of the EE impact on energy consumption. 
According to this reasoning, similarities between two systems are presumed to support 
the conclusion that some further similarity exists. Adopting this reasoning, stakeholders 
presume that by increasing spending on EE programs, there will be an analogous 
decrease in the demand for energy. This reasoning by analogy approach is dominant in 
the energy market. Programs, policies, and expectations, in general, are driven by 
assumptions that are based on this concept. This research explores the reasoning by 
analogy approach and compares program outcomes using the economic principles 
angle.  
Therefore, the goal of this study is to examine and evaluate the effectiveness of the 
above-mentioned electricity EE programs that provide financial incentives for reducing 
overall energy consumption in the contiguous US for a period of eleven years examining 
data on 3,745 utilities. The quantitative task is difficult and tedious because of the size 
of the dataset examined. However, the importance of the study justifies the challenge. 
A better understanding of the mechanism of financial incentives will help state energy 
policy-makers to be more effective. The focus is on the economics, and not the driving 
politics, to identify precisely how subsidies and EE programs result in reducing energy 
demand, specifically in the case of electricity consumption. It is also essential to develop 
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a comparative understanding of the energy policies related to renewable energy (RE) 
generation. As the cost of RE decreases and the cost of EE progresses, there is a tipping 
point where the two technologies will be competitive.  It is also important to understand 
the temporal cost of EE and if there are economies of scales in the implementation.  The 
contemporary analysis, introduced in this research, provides better insights on how 
public funds must be spent to optimize results. Governments and market leaders can 
utilize available economic tools to significantly increase the effectiveness of 
technological developments in the fields of renewable energy (RE) generation and 
energy efficiency (EE) technologies. The target is to reduce the amount of greenhouse 
gases emitted into the atmosphere, and both EE and RE can contribute significantly 
towards this goal. The new energy equilibrium will be a result of simultaneous changes 
in technological innovations in RE production and behavioral changes using EE. 
Understanding the relationship between financial incentive programs and energy 
investments will uncover a path for sustainable development.  
The energy savings that are the product of EE programs are reported by utilities and the 
magnitude of the savings reported essentially defines the unit cost. To achieve additional 
savings, the trend has been to increase subsidies continually. A better understanding of 
the practical results of the mechanism of subsidies will assist governments in adopting 
appropriate policies that would balance the negative externalities of fossil fuels with 
sustainable economic growth and prosperity via the better use of new technologies and 
methodologies. Economic theory identifies reasons that the savings from utilities are 
lower than utilities expect and report. This research identifies and describes the barriers 
6 
 
that reduce the expected savings and increase the cost of EE. The empirical application 
quantifies this discrepancy and examines different EE policies.  
There are known barriers when evaluating the cost-effectiveness of EE programs for 
electricity. This is because a substantial amount of errors may occur, due to 
inconsistencies across utility companies, specifically on how they measure energy 
savings and adjust estimates for free riders or spillover effects. Additionally, electricity 
energy savings based on engineering models typically don’t capture changes in 
consumer behavior, and as a result, tend to overstate energy savings due to not 
considering the rebound effect.  Any evaluation, therefore, should take under account 
free riders and the rebound effect both of which increase the cost of EE.  
This study examines the reported electricity savings from utilities and compares their 
magnitude to econometric models of electricity demand. The objective is to understand 
if the obstacles identified from literature result in different than expected outcomes in 
energy savings. The expectations of EE programs are enormous. Based on the annual 
reports that administrators of energy efficiency programs submit to the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), savings from electricity efficiency programs from 
2005 to 2015 have reduced total electricity sales across the nation by about 1%. 
Investments in energy efficiency do contribute to the solution to climate change by 
steering the energy market in the right direction. This paper, however, assesses if the 
magnitude of the effectiveness of investments in energy efficiency meets the reported 




In the literature review, we summarize the role of the energy efficiency programs since 
they were first introduced and describe the economic theory underlined in the research.  
In the methodology chapter, there is an analysis of the quantitative econometric methods 
involved to evaluate the effectiveness of the EE programs. The Research Findings 
chapter provides estimates of the cost-effectiveness of EE programs and examines the 
hypothesis that energy efficiency programs are a predictor of energy consumption. 
Additionally, a comparative analysis examines EE programs with a different magnitude 
in programmatic costs to evaluate effectiveness. In the Conclusion, there is a discussion 
related to the EE incentive programs and policy implications. Finally, the Figures and 





Chapter 2. Literature review 
This study examines the effectiveness of energy efficiency subsidy programs 
specifically for the electricity market. The following literature review examines this 
and reviews the related conceptual framework. The concepts of energy efficiency in 
general and energy efficiency for the electricity market, are reviewed chronologically 
as they first emerged along with the correlating scientific and socioeconomic events 
that drove relevant public policy. It is also depicted that despite the high amounts of 
funding dedicated on these subsidies, the published data on the effectiveness of energy 
subsidy programs using observational data rather than reported data is scarce hence 
documenting the importance of this study. In addition, it is exhibited that in the 
published research there is no explicit universal model that allows governments to 
calculate, compare and contrast savings accrued as a direct result of efficiency 
programs. In the cases where so-called undisputable savings are claimed, the true 
drivers of those gains for different end uses are also not clear. For example, some of 
the published or expected gains from these energy efficiency programs do not take 
under consideration the rebound effect or take-back effect; a well-established 
phenomenon in economics that paradoxically reduces gains due to behavioral or other 
systemic responses. These responses, in published past cases of expected gains from 
the adoption of new technologies, have limited or even completely offset the expected 
benefits.  
Historically, EE programs appear to have been put in place because of a combination 
of scientific data and public opinion pressures regarding environmental concerns. 
These concerns have primarily been focused on the idea that greenhouse gas emissions 
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and their environmental impacts could reach a tipping point that would present a clear 
and present danger to global economic growth and prosperity. Over a span of four 
decades, researchers, experts, and theorists came to the realization that climate change 
is a severe threat, so great, it must be addressed jointly by the international 
community.  
The literature review chapter is partitioned into two sections; the historical background 
and the theoretical framework. The historical background reviews literature that 
follows depicts, compares, contrasts, and analyzes the following: how EE programs 
came to be in the first place; the energy gap; regulation policies; and the paradox of 
energy efficiency improvements and how their effectiveness has been determined in 
the published bibliography. The theoretical framework introduces concepts, in 
economic principles, as to why improvements in efficiency may differ from expected 
energy conservation results. 
 
2.1 Historical Background 
2.1.1 Energy efficiency programs defined 
According to the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE), energy 
efficiency (EE) programs target a reduction in energy demand by offering financial 
incentives for investments in new, clean and more efficient equipment and technologies. 
EE programs have always offered subsidies to consumers to upgrade appliances, heating 
and cooling equipment, building envelopes. They have also aimed at long-term 
behavioral change, through education. The ultimate objective is to reduce energy 
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consumption, which in turn reduces dependency on the fossil fuels that produce 
greenhouse gas emissions and lead to climate change. It is only during the past few years 
that EE programs have been developed as stand-alone programs. Initially, EE programs 
were part of the demand side management programs (DSM) which are designed to 
encourage consumers to modify their pattern and level of electricity consumption.  The 
historical evolution of these programs sheds light on their importance and the contextual 
socioeconomic circumstances under which they were conceived and implemented in the 
first place.  
 
2.1.2 Energy efficiency and conservation 
It is necessary to highlight the distinction between EE and energy conservation and to 
define more analytically the term efficiency. Energy conservation is generally defined 
as a reduction in the total amount of energy consumed. Energy conservation may or 
may not be achieved with the implementation of EE investments. This distinction is 
critical in understanding issues such as the "rebound and backfire effect", described in 
this chapter, whereby the demand for energy may increase in response to EE 
investments, because of a decrease in the cost of energy supply. Also, energy 
conservation implies a behavioral change to save energy that doesn't necessarily 
includes investments in equipment. Then again, EE is a synonym to improvements in 
equipment and technology that use energy. Efficiency in energy is typically defined as 
the energy services provided per unit of energy input. In lighting applications, for 
example, efficiency is the ratio of luminous flux to power, measured in lumens per 
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watt. As the index of efficiency increases (ratio of units of service to energy units) it is 
implied that per unit of input, we have better service, an improvement in illumination. 
As a result, investments in EE technologies will produce the same or better service for 
the same amount of energy input.  
 
2.1.3 Specification for energy efficiency programs  
The industry assesses the effectiveness of EE programs by using engineer-derived 
stipulated estimates. For example, in the case where someone purchases an LED fixture, 
it is estimated that there will be savings of 30 kWh per year for a period of 15 years. 
This example describes the situation where a consumer will purchase and replace an 
incandescent light bulb of 60 watts with an LED of 10 watts and will operate it for 600 
hours annually. The replacement will generate savings of 50 watt-hours for every hour 
of operation or 30 kWh annually. 
In order to increase the market penetration of the new efficient lighting technology, the 
EE program will subsidize the price of the LED to lower the purchase price and increase 
the number of efficient light bulbs sold. The same mechanism applies to many types of 
heating and cooling equipment, electronic devices, water heaters, home appliances and 
building materials. 
The process just described has a clear rational but may suffer from a number of 
assumptions that produce unrealistic expectations. Selection bias is the principal 
economic concern related to subsidies (Hartman, 1988). Selection bias arises from the 
fact that treated individuals differ from the non-treated for a reason or reasons other than 
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treatment status. In the case of EE programs, there is a concern that the group of 
consumers that make EE investments is not representative of the general public. In other 
words, subsidies - the treatment to increase EE investments - may benefit higher income 
populations instead of benefiting everyone (Herring, 2006).   
In addition to selection bias, the spillover effect could potentially increase the effect of 
an EE program. Spillover refers to energy savings produced by decisions beyond those 
directly associated with participating in an EE program. Conceptually, spillover can be 
achieved by both participants and non-participants (Violette & Rathbun, 2014). 
Participant spillover occurs when consumers choose to implement additional EE 
investments after having participated in an EE program. Non-participation spillover 
occurs when energy savings are realized by consumers that implement EE measures 
without having participated in a particular EE program.  
 
2.1.4 Brief history of energy efficiency programs 
The idea of a viable perpetually growing economy has always been appealing to many. 
Although, the consequences of exponential growth, when resources are finite, has been 
clearly expressed in cornerstone works like ‘The Limits to Growth’, a report for the 
Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind (Meadows, Meadows, Randers, 
& Behrens, 1972). In the book, the authors proclaimed in the early 70s “if the present 
growth trends continue unchanged, the limits of growth on this planet will be reached 
sometime within the next hundred years.” (p. 23). This seminal work which dealt with 
factors that limited human economic and population growth predicted that the economy 
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would probably collapse some time before the end of 20th century. At the time it was 
published, such predictions were criticized as dystopic science fiction. Clearly, the belief 
in a perpetually growing economy and the need for clean energy, energy efficiency, and 
sustainability had not yet entered the mainstream as an essential field of study in the 
early 70's. A drastic change appeared in the mid 70's when the concepts of energy 
efficiency and demand response programs appeared heavily in the literature. In the 
bibliography, they are referred to by the term Demand Side Management (DSM) 
programs. They were developed following the October 1973 oil embargo by the 
members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (Gellings, 1985). 
The crisis that followed that embargo, combined with the following 1973–74 stock 
market crash, was considered the most devastating event on the U.S. economy since the 
Great Depression (Perron, 1988). Public opinion at the time was a significant 
determinant for policy change aimed at energy conservation and strategic fuel 
independence. Typically, DSM programs were subsidized with a small percentage of 
total revenue from customers, around 2-3% in successful implementations and 
sometimes received funding from the state or federal government (Geller, 2004). 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, DSM programs consisted of 
the “planning, implementing, and monitoring activities of electric utilities which are 
designed to encourage consumers to modify their level and pattern of electricity usage.” 
The EIA issued reports on them up to the year 2000, and the primary objective of most 
DSM programs was to provide cost-effective solutions in the energy market. DSM 
programs promoted behavioral changes that helped defer the need for new sources of 
power, including generating facilities, and transmission and distribution capacity 
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additions. They had focused on decreasing energy consumption and shifting demand to 
off-peak times, such as nighttime and weekends. In any case, environmental goals were 
not the objective for these forms of energy-efficiency programs that were first 
introduced in the 1970s. 
 
2.1.5 Utilities and regulation policy   
Utilities have a long history of operation. Thomas Edison opened the first public 
electricity company in early 1882. A steam-powered electricity generation station at 
Holborn Viaduct in London supplied the local consumers with electric light. Edison 
used the method of direct current (DC) to supply electricity. The DC method is 
constrained in its range of service, and power stations had to be within a mile of the 
consumers. Later the same year, in September 1882 in New York, Thomas Edison 
opened the Pearl Street Power Station (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001).  
Utilities for many decades operated as monopolies. When the New York Stock 
Exchange crashed in 1929, the US entered the Great Depression, and many electric 
companies across the nation collapsed. In 1935, Congress passed the Public Utilities 
Holding Company Act (PUHCA) to prevent unfair practices in the energy sector. 
PUHCA was the government’s first attempt to regulate the energy industry. The 
regulation limited utilities' operations to a single state and thus made them subject to 
effective state regulation. Before the introduction of the regulation, in 1932, the eight 
largest utilities controlled 73% of the investor-owned electricity market  (Hyman, 1988).      
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Following the 1973 energy crisis, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policy 
Act (PURPA) in 1978, with the expectation that this bill would reduce US dependency 
on foreign fossil fuels. This legislation was part of the National Energy Act, designed to 
promote energy conservation and increase investments in renewable-energy supplies by 
establishing a program for small hydroelectric power projects (Pub.L.95-617, 1978). 
The policy was designed to diversify the US power supply and encourage energy 
conservation. This would be accomplished via regulations that required utilities to 
purchase power from new producers when their own supply was low. It was the 
administration of President Carter that started to emphasize the importance of energy 
investments for sustainable development. Making energy policy a top priority, he signed 
PURPA in an effort to remedy the energy crisis. PURPA restructured the energy market 
and encouraged energy efficiency and hydropower investments. President Carter 
associated the energy crisis in one of his speeches with the “moral equivalent of war” 
(Bennet, 2006) and pointed out that energy efficiency was the “quickest, cheapest, most 
practical source of energy” (Bennett, 2006 p.462). According to President Carter’s 
philosophy on energy issues, government involvement must promote energy policies in 
the way that David Freeman (Freeman, 1974) and Amory Lovins (Lovins, 1976) 
advocate. Both David Freeman and Amory Lovins indicated that America’s energy 
needs could be more easily met by investing in technologies and equipment that use less 
energy to perform the same tasks as less efficient appliances and methods. Since the 
days of the Carter administration, all the following US presidents have supported energy 
policies that target both the demand and supply aspects of the energy market. Energy 
programs continued to encourage behavior change in energy demand, such as using less 
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energy and shifting consumption to off-peak periods like nighttime and weekends 
(Darby, 2006). Following the second oil crisis of 1979, which drove demand for more 
fuel-efficient automobiles, more and more economists were studying energy 
consumption and behavior to a great extent to determine overall efficiency and savings. 
Stemming from independent research, and based on the well-known phenomenon 
known as the Jevons Paradox, economists Leonard Brookes and Daniel Khazzoom 
(Saunders, 1992) concluded that increased energy efficiency paradoxically tends to lead 
to increased energy consumption. They conducted their research on the fuel efficiency 
that was achieved for automobiles on average, while overall consumption had continued 
to increase.  
 
2.1.6 The energy efficiency gap 
The idea of an energy efficiency gap and the market barriers to energy efficiency 
investments was part of the literature in the 70s. Literature, including the IEA, identifies 
the difference between observed and optimal investments in EE, as the energy efficiency 
gap.  
The concept of energy efficiency as a policy strategy was developed by Lovins who 
supported investments that will use less energy to produce greater economic output 
(Lovins, 1976). Later this decade, it was suggested that when selecting durable goods, 
consumers trade off capital cost and energy cost as if they heavily discount future energy 
savings (Hausman, 1979) (Train, 1988). The failure of consumers to make energy-
saving investments that have a positive net present value is the core concept explored 
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by economic literature according to the EE gap. The same consumer behavior is 
observed in the vehicle market where consumers undervalue future fuel savings (Allcott 
& Wozny, 2014) (Helfand & Wolverton, 2009). These studies suggest that the way 
consumers make decisions about energy efficiency investments leads to lower spending 
on energy-efficient products that would be expected if consumers made all positive net 
present value investments. This behavior has come to be known as the energy efficiency 
gap. However, the energy efficiency gap concept has been met with skepticism. The use 
of analyses showing investments in energy-saving technologies that appear profitable 
from a net present value perspective has caused even more skepticism (Soest & Bulte, 
2001). Many economists question the regularity of the decision-making models, and the 
cost assumptions stated to identify the existence of underinvestment in energy 
efficiency. Some researchers have stated that the energy efficiency gap has been used as 
political justification for intervention in energy efficiency markets through efficiency 
tax credits and other subsidies and claim that empirical evidence for a significant energy 
efficiency gap is limited (Allcott & Greenstone, 2012). On the other hand, the literature 
in energy economics has long identified that market failures can lead to low levels of 
investments in energy efficiency. Lack of information, environmental externalities, and 
principle-agent issues can drive EE investment to suboptimal levels (Gillingham & 
Palmer, 2014). Recently, economists explain the energy efficiency gap as a result of 






2.1.7 Sustainable development 
As stated, a gradual progression in the research from energy independence to topics like 
environmental awareness and later to that of climate change have become increasingly 
relevant to the topic of energy efficiency and renewable energy. There have been 
discussions that go as far as 200 hundred years ago regarding the impact of civilization 
on the environment since the time of demographer, political economist and country 
pastor Thomas Robert Malthus (Rogers, Jalal, & Boyd, 2012). However, it was not until 
the mid-70s that that applied examples of this conceptual progression became a practice 
with programs like property tax incentives for the purchase of residential solar 
technology. These incentives programs involved two states in 1974, twenty-eight states 
in 1976 and increased to forty-four states by 1981 (Hinds, 1981). The same period, we 
have the introduction of DSM programs offered by electric utilities. DSM programs 
started modestly in the 1970s as a response to the increasing concerns about dependence 
on foreign fossil fuels. The programmatic cost increased rapidly during the late 1980s 
with the introduction of incentive programs for utilities to pursue least-cost or integrated 
resource planning principles (Eto, 1996). In 1987, the notion of sustainable development 
emerged in the literature in the modern sense with the publication of the Brundtland 
report by the UN World Commission on Environmental and Development (Keeble, 
1988). Scientists began to research and understand that environmental concerns like 
stratospheric ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity and acid rain were international and 
required a transboundary response. On the other hand, there was a disincentive to any 
change because utilities’ gross income was stemmed by the throughput incentive: a 
contribution to gross income that occurred with every energy unit due to the fact that 
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the unit variable price recovered some of a utility’s fixed costs (Morgan, 2013). In the 
mid-80s it became apparent that a government regulated separation of a utility’s 
revenues from its unit sales and profit volumes was necessary; a sort of "decoupling." 
Electric utility DSM programs peaked in 1993,  spending $2.7 billion or about one 
percent of U.S. utility revenues. 
 
2.1.8 Decoupling 
A regulatory tool that effectively disassociated the utility's profits from its sales of the 
energy commodity became known as "decoupling." It is the mechanism that disrupts the 
alignment of the rate of return with meeting revenue targets and encourages firms to 
nudge consumers toward reducing energy use and adopting energy efficiency programs 
themselves. This indifference to sales and focus on energy efficiency changed the 
overall utility environment forever. Since then, the utility's revenue from fixed costs has 
remained at levels regulators determine to be fair and reasonable while the financial risk 
for the utility decreases. Decoupling has been recognized as a win-win strategy to both 
utility companies and the environment by actively encouraging energy efficiency 
because it ensures that a utility still recovers short-run fixed costs if consumption 
declines as a result of carbon reduction policies (Shirley, Lazar, & Weston, 2008). 
 
2.1.9 Climate change and energy efficiency 
In the early 1990s, the literature began to broaden its attention to include global 
environmental issues such as global warming and climate change (Bergh, 2016). 
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However, it is only after the change of the millennium that US EE programs increased 
the incentives for electricity and natural gas investments significantly.     
   
Figure 1: Electricity and natural gas efficiency programs ($ million) 
Note. Data for electricity and natural gas efficiency programs in the United States 
from the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy: State scorecard 2016    
 
 
2.1.10 Deregulation policies  
Deregulation means that the generation process in the electricity market will be open 
to competition; however, the transmission and distribution of the electricity market 
will remain a regulated monopoly. The market openness in electricity generation 
provides customers a choice of how they purchase and use electricity.  
Deregulation policies play a crucial role when examining the ownership status of 
electric utilities because they signify whether the utilities are directly regulated by the 
government, which affects the administration of energy-efficiency programs 
(Blumstein, Goldman, & Barbose, 2005). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) introduced Orders 888, 889, and 2000, which allowed all power producers fair 
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access to transmission lines for safe and reliable power (Sioshansi, 2001). These 
regulations essentially broke up integrated utilities by forcing them either to sell their 
power plants to a third party or, transfer them to an unregulated affiliate. To address 
concerns about reliability and safety of the shared power grid, regulators decided to 
empower two groups: the regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and the 
independent system operators (ISOs). This legacy instituted by FERC is in place 
today, and the two groups monitor and control the operation of the power grid across 
most regions of the US (Tomain, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 2: Deregulated energy - States and markets 






2.1.11 Energy efficiency programs and global temperature 
Publications of the findings on greenhouse gas emissions and the ever-rising average 
global temperature fueled public concerns regarding greenhouse emissions. In 2003, 
British prime minister Tony Blair and Swedish prime minister Göran Persson sent a 
joint letter to the European Commission (Ruda, 2003). They urged that if a government's 
fundamental goal is to promote economic growth and prosperity, it had to be combined 
with the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions with a "decoupling" of economic growth 
from its environmental impacts. In his speech on sustainable development, Mr. Blair 
said, "It is clear that Kyoto is not radical enough." Once again, the concept of energy 
efficiency was employed and was being called to accomplish increasingly diverse goals. 
At 2015, United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, policymakers otherwise 
reluctant to implement climate policies fueled by renewed public interest legislated the 
reduction of energy demand by investing in clean, more efficient, non-greenhouse gas 
emitting equipment and technologies. For a second-time governments were driven by 
external factors: global warming statistics and public outcry. The pledge to drastically 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions via behavioral change through education alone is by 
definition a long-term goal. In contrast, the tool immediately available to governments 
to achieve the 2015 Climate Change Conference goals was the adoption of specific 
energy efficiency (EE) programs propagated by subsidies as part of a new 
comprehensive climate policy framework. As a result, during the past few years, EE 
programs have developed as stand-alone programs separate from the demand response 
(DR) programs. As program budgets increased, EE and DR programs were developed 
in parallel but followed distinct paths. In EE programs’ development, electricity utilities 
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often play the role of the administrators with state governments mostly playing the role 
of regulator. They are perceived as successful programs with a twofold gain: offering 
both environmental and economic benefits. Many states have broadly adopted the 
current objectives of EE programs, and in 2015, State-supported System Benefit 
Charges (SBC) used to generate funds for electric EE programs via a per kWh charge 
on electric bills reached 1% of total electricity revenues. Of course, there is a wide range 
in SBC collections with the states of Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Vermont leading 
the nation with EE program spending equating to more than 6% of their state's electricity 
revenues. Concerning monetary burden, in Rhode Island for example, in 2015, the 
annual cost per residential household associated with EE's System Benefit Charge 
(SBC) was $73. At the same time, other states have more moderate programs and many 
states that don't support energy efficiency programs at all. 
 
2.1.12 The role of incentives in energy efficiency programs 
Policymakers have identified energy efficiency as a means of combating the rising costs of 
energy, energy shortages, and climate change. Thus, incentives to encourage energy 
efficiency were established. Investing in programs for energy efficiency may help accelerate 
the adoption of innovative technologies and encourage investments in energy efficiency. 
Consequently, EE programs can lead to a reduction in the growth of energy consumption. 
The timing of energy efficiency implementation is critical. Financial incentives can 
contribute to consumers investing in energy efficiency earlier than they otherwise would 
have (Gillingham, Rapson, & Wagner, 2015).  
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A theoretical model of a private energy efficiency investment is illustrated in Figure 3:. 
Given the initial marginal cost MC, the optimum quantity of investment in EE is 𝑄1. Offering 
financial incentives on EE decreases the marginal cost of the investment. The new optimum 
quantity is 𝑄2. At this level of EE investments, individuals that would have invested at the 
initial unsubsidized level 𝑄1will benefit from the incentives (free riders).  
 Energy efficiency programs are about efficiency change; getting people to adapt existing 
technologies, such as LED lights, that use less electricity. EE investments can be 
implemented at any time, and financial incentives may accelerate implementation. We can 
reasonably expect all consumers to replace inefficient technologies, eventually. The 
consumers with investments in EE=𝑄2 should be thought of as the consumers induced to 
invest in more efficient technologies due to offered financial incentives at time t, who 
otherwise would have invested in energy efficiency at some future time (t+n). The objective 
of accelerating the deployment of energy efficiency can be achieved with a number of 
different programs and policies. As mentioned above, the focus of this proposed research is 
to assess the effectiveness of financial incentive programs for energy efficiency. In addition 
to these programs, states support other initiatives such as building energy code enhancements 
and compliance, transportation policies, appliances and equipment standards, and State 
government “lead by example programs” as conventional methods of reducing energy 

















Figure 3: Subsidized marginal cost and free riding 
 
 
Note. The figure demonstrates an increase in EE investments when the marginal cost 
decreases with subsidies. Given the initial marginal cost, the optimal level of 
investments in EE  is 𝑸
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.  In the case that an energy efficiency program offers financial 
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2.1.13 Energy efficiency programs for the electricity market 
EE programs are developed in both the electricity and natural gas markets. This thesis 
narrows the investigation of EE programs to the electricity market, but some perspective 
is necessary. Electricity programs and natural gas programs are distinct due to different 
targets and budgets. Electric EE programs have been implemented for decades while 
natural gas programs only just gained a notable presence after 2006 (Figure 1: 
Electricity and natural gas efficiency programs ($ million). Regarding the magnitude 
of their budgets, electric EE programs are much larger with about five times the budgets 
of natural gas programs. The electric EE programs across the nation target all aspects of 
economic activity from the residential sector to commercial, industrial and 
transportation. The electric EE programs are sophisticated and target appliances, 
lighting and HVAC systems by offering solutions that will decrease consumption while 
providing the same or better level of service. It is worth mention that during the last few 
years the US has experienced a revolution in EE lighting solutions with the introduction 
of light-emitting diode (LED) technologies in all lighting applications (indoors and 
outdoors). Lighting accounts for about 7% of the total US electricity consumption (EIA, 
2016) and LED technology has the potential to reduce this consumption by more than 





2.1.14 Energy efficiency programs and effectiveness 
In theory, efficiency is measured by the quantity of output divided by the quantity of 
energy input. Traditionally efficient technologies have had a higher upfront cost, but the 
promise was that eventually money and energy would be saved. The utilities also faced 
the challenge of mounting investment costs of new generation environmentally friendly 
but high-cost power plants just to meet the ever-rising demand. They too had an interest, 
therefore, in energy efficiency as a resource to decrease capital investments while 
meeting electricity demand (Geller, 2004). Concerning the cost-effectiveness of EE 
electricity programs, there is controversy found within the literature. Estimates of the 
cost-effectiveness of EE programs range from $0.01 to $0.22 per kWh saved. 
Gillingham et al. (2004) estimate the cost of incentive programs at $0.039 per kWh. 
Friedrich et al. (2009) used utility and state evaluations for 14 states to estimate an 
average cost to utilities of $0.025 per kWh saved. Loughran and Kulick (2004) 
examined panel data on 324 utilities, between 1989 and 1999, and reported an average 
cost of  $0.06 - $0.22 per kWh. Auffhammer, Blumstein, and Fowlie (2008) examined 
the same period and estimated the cost of energy savings  $0.01 - $0.08 per kWh. 
Arimura et al. (2012) evaluated ratepayer-funded DSM expenditures between 1992 and 
2006 and estimated expected average cost to utilities of roughly $0.05 per kWh.  
 
2.1.15 Rebound effect and energy efficiency programs 
Researchers have questioned the assumption that consumers require the same level of 
energy services before and after an efficiency investment. The discussion of evaluation 
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of EE programs has focused on concepts that distort program effectiveness and are 
associated with an increased demand of electricity over time when the cost for the 
commodity drops with the implementation of EE. This effect is well documented in the 
growing literature as the “rebound effect” and results in decreased energy savings after 
EE improvements are implemented. Empirical estimates of the effect were documented 
in many studies. A paper focused entirely on residential energy savings in countries that 
are members of the organization for economic co-operation and development (OECD) 
estimated the direct rebound effect at 30% (Sorrell, Dimitropoulos, & Sommerville, 
2009). Empirical evidence from Austria identify the rebound effect for space heating 
between 20-30% (Haas & Biermayr, 2000).  The estimated rebound effect can differ 
widely depending on the application (lighting, appliances, building envelop, HVAC), 
the place and the time of the study. Even more substantial rebound effects that reached 
80% were found in the US residential sector over the period from 1995 to 2011. This 
indicates that policymakers should be aware that the expected energy savings from 
efficiency improvements may not be achieved (Orea, Llorca, & Filippini, 2015).  
 
2.1.16 Evaluation, measurement and verification (EM&V) of EE programs 
The practice to evaluate, measure and verify energy-efficiency programs goes back to 
1970s and early 1980s and was conducted by federal entities like the US Department of 
Energy’s Weatherization Assistance Program and by State Energy Programs (Vine, Hall, 
Keating, Kushler, & Prahl, 2010).  EM&V is the collection of methods and processes to 
assess the energy savings expected from the implementation of energy efficiency 
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measures. The goal is to identify and achieved results with greater certainty and 
accuracy so that future programs can be more effective. Practically, EM&V process 
quantifies the benefits of EE as a cost-effective, reliable resource. 
Based on the experience in the US, the most important and transferable technical issues 
are "net savings" (incrementality), evaluation of market transformation programs, and 
evaluation of the carbon impacts of energy-efficiency programs. Of these, the most 
significant technical issue is the evaluation of net energy savings (versus gross energy 
savings). According to a background paper for subsidies in the energy sector, the 
European Union does not use a consistent evaluation method for EE programs for each 
member country (Bacon, Ley, & Kojima, 2010). The picture is similar in US and EM&V 
is evolving along with the of EE programs. Some states provide leadership with their 
regulatory framework. California and Massachusetts are identified as the principal states 
in the EM&V framework (Nowak, Molina, & Kushler, 2017).       
According to a study prepared by the ACEEE  (Nowak, Molina, & Kushler, 2017), the 
three topics with essential developments in the EM&V process are the: technical 
reference manuals (TRM), the common practice baselines (CPBs), and the advanced 
metering-based M&V. The TRM is a classification of EE measures that outlines the 
expected energy savings either through deemed savings values or engineering 
algorithms. The CPBs are energy consumption estimates of what a typical end-user 
would have done and are used as the basis for baseline energy usage. Lastly, advanced 
metering describes the measurement and verification methodology that use available 
energy data and incorporate data analytics to improve effectiveness.  
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2.2 Theoretical Framework 
Investments in Energy Efficiency (EE) address energy challenges by reducing energy 
demand. The core idea is that such investments are cost-effective. Furthermore, EE is 
often treated as a source of energy supply because it can displace electricity generation. 
For that reason, EE supporters compare the EE marginal cost of saving energy to the 
marginal cost of producing energy and argue that the energy savings from customer EE 
programs are typically achieved at a lower cost than the cost of new generation of energy 
(Yang & Yu, 2015). Additionally, energy generation almost always involves 
environmental impacts, even in the case of wind and solar generation.  Reducing 
demand can also reduce the need to transmission capacity and reduce peak demand. For 
this reason, in the literature, EE is described as "first fuel." 
Acceptance of the concept that EE programs are essential drivers for cost-effective 
energy conservation has created a framework where subsidies for EE have been viewed 
as a critical strategy. For that reason, states compete to achieve energy savings by 
increasing their spending for EE programs each year. This is an "analogical reasoning" 
understanding of the EE impact on energy consumption. Stakeholders believe that by 
increasing spending on EE programs, there will be an analogous decrease in demand for 
energy. This "reasoning by analogy" approach is dominant in the energy market. 
Programs, policies, and expectations, in general, are driven by assumptions that are 
based on this concept. 
This research provides a rigorous economic analysis based on economic principles to 
examine the potential role of efficiency in meeting energy demand. The chapter 
introduces the economic theory to understand consumer behavior regarding energy use 
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and energy efficiency better. Analytically, the theory explores the rebound effect from 
principles in consumer theory and derives the welfare implications of the rebound effect.  
As already mentioned, in the distinction between EE and energy conservation, energy 
conservation may or may not be achieved with the implementation of EE investments. 
This distinction is critical in understanding issues such as the "rebound and backfire 
effect," described in this chapter, whereby the demand for energy may actually increase 






2.2.1 Microeconomic theory - Electricity demand  
This section provides a theoretical framework to explain, in economic principles, why 
improvements in efficiency may have different than expected energy conservation 
results. The core idea is that the benefits to a consumer (or a producer) of energy services 
due to the implementation of an EE investment would essentially come down to a price 
reduction in energy. According to microeconomic theory, this price reduction will drive 
two effects: an own-price effect and indirect effects of income changes. The first-order 
effect will most probably reduce the energy savings. The reduced cost of energy services 
will increase disposable income. Economic agents with improved purchasing power will 
then increase their expenditure on other commodities, including appliances or services 
that require energy consumption. The first-order effect of this expenditure would likely 
increase the quantity demanded energy services, and partially offset energy savings. 
In other words, initially, an increase in energy efficiency will reduce the cost of energy 
services. The law of demand suggests that this will likely increase the demand for energy 
services. An example of this is an increase in fuel efficiency in automobiles which 
reduces the cost per mile of driving, leading to an increase in miles driven. 
Second, this reduction in the price of energy services leads to an effective increase in 
disposable income. If energy services are a normal good, this will also increase the 
quantity demanded 
The Slutsky equation (below) demonstrates that the change in the demand for a service 
that is an outcome of a price change, is the result of two effects; a substitution effect and 












 𝑥𝑗(𝑝, 𝑤) 
Where ℎ𝑖(𝑝, 𝑢) is the Hicksian demand and 𝑥𝑖(𝑝, 𝑤) is the Marshallian demand, at  price 
levels p, income level w, and fixed utility level u. The right side of the equation is equal 
to the change in demand for a service i, as a result of a price p change,  holding utility 
fixed at u; minus the quantity of service j demanded, multiplied by the change in 
demand for service i, when income w changes. 
Hicksian demand ℎ𝑖(𝑝, 𝑢) is consumer’s demand for a bundle of goods and services that 
minimizes the expenditure at a fixed level of utility u. Marshallian demand 𝑥𝑖(𝑝, 𝑤) 
shows the relationship between the price of a service and the quantity demanded.  The 
analysis that follows rests on neo-classic economic assumptions. Economic agents have 
rational preferences between outcomes, consumers maximize utility and producers 
maximize profits and all agents act independently on the basis of full and relevant 
information.   
 
2.2.2 The consumer of energy services 
Economic theory is based on the assumption that a household, or any entity acting as a 
consumer, will maximize utility subject to an income constraint. Consumer’s 
preferences can be implicitly described by a utility function u(x,𝑠1, 𝑠2), where energy 
services are denoted 𝑠𝑖 and non-energy commodities as x. In the utility function, we 
consider two energy services, 𝑠1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠2 where 𝑠2 encompasses all energy services 
besides 𝑠1.  A simplified form of the model would have a one-to-one relationship 
between energy services and fuels, such that each fuel is used for a single service and 
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each service can be obtained from a single fuel. In addition to this assumption, there 
would not be any changes in income from investments in efficiency. However, 
Borenstein (2015) shows in his analysis that as EE investments decrease disposable 
income, the magnitude of the rebound effect is reduced.  
The consumer’s model is derived where energy services 𝑠𝑖 are provided through the 
consumption of fuels j=1, 2 at the price 𝑝𝑗. Efficiency (𝜂𝑖𝑗) is used to produce energy 
service 𝑠𝑖 that is obtained by fuel j at the fuel cost of 𝑝𝑗 with the corresponding fuel 
consumption of 𝑓𝑖𝑗. The consumer has disposable income w. Numeraire good x has its 
price normalized to unity. The consumer’s problem therefore is given by: 
max
𝑥,𝑠1,𝑠2
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠1, 𝑠2)  
subject to 𝑠1 = 𝜂11𝑓11 
𝑠2 = 𝜂22𝑓22 
w = x + 𝑝1𝑓11 + 𝑝2𝑓22 
 
The solution to the utility maximization problem yields the demand for energy services, 
denoted 𝑠𝑖
∗ (𝜂11, 𝜂22, 𝑝1, 𝑝2 , 𝑤). The demand for energy that maximizes consumer’s 
utility can conveniently be  rewritten as 𝑠𝑖
∗ (𝜋1, 𝜋2, 𝑤), where 𝜋𝑖 = 
𝑝𝑖
𝜂𝑖𝑖
 is the implicit 
price of the service 𝑠𝑖
∗. The corresponding fuel consumption of 𝑓𝑖𝑖
∗(𝜋, 𝑤) = 𝑠𝑖
∗ (𝜋, 𝑤) /  
𝜂𝑖𝑖 . 
As energy efficiency for service i=1 changes, with an improvement of 𝜂11, the 
comparative statics obtained, show how changes in energy services and fuel demand 
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impact (decreased) the implicit price of energy services. With an increase in efficiency, 
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2.2.3 Direct rebound effect  
Following the previous notation, an increase in energy efficiency, 𝜂11, would affect fuel 
consumption 𝑓11 from additional use of energy services, due to the decrease in the price 
of usage 𝜋1. The direct effect is typically defined in terms of elasticities. Elasticity of 
demand for a with respect to b (𝜀𝑎,𝑏) describes the direct rebound effect as 𝜀𝑓11,𝜂11+ 1 
or equivalently,  𝜀𝑠1,𝜂11 . 
Energy prices influence consumer’s decisions regarding the consumption of energy. As 
energy prices change, the elasticity of demand for energy would result in different 
consumer behaviors. If the elasticity of demand for the service is zero, 𝜀𝑠1,𝜂11 = 0,  the 
direct rebound effect would be zero. Equivalently, if the elasticity of demand for the 
service is -1,  𝜀𝑓11,𝜂11= - 1, the entire increase in energy efficiency will be realized as a 
decrease in fuel consumption. The consumer purchases no more of the service when its 
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price falls, and the naïve view of energy saving prevails.  For example, doubling gas 
mileage means consumer uses half as much gasoline.  
In contrast, if 𝜀𝑠1,𝜂11 = 1, then we expect a 100% direct rebound effect. The consumer 
has 𝜀𝑓11,𝜂11= 0, and there is not any fuel saving from efficiency improvements. The 
consumer uses exactly the same amount of energy, but gets more service.  The price per 
mile decreases by 50%, but the consumer now drives twice as many miles.  There is no 
reduction in energy use, but the consumer benefits by getting more service. In the case 
of a greater than 100% rebound effect, i.e., the elasticity is greater than 1, then the 
‘backfire effect’ occurs. More energy is used when energy efficiency increases. 
If elasticity falls between zero and -1, the consumer purchases more of the service, but 
the net effect is less energy is used, and the consumer gets more of the service.  For 
example, if efficiency doubles gas mileage, the price per mile is 50% of what it was.  At 
the lower price, the consumer might drive 50% more miles than previously, while using 
25% less gasoline.  
Gillingham et al. (2009) provide a summary of previous studies of the estimates of 
energy own-price elasticities in both the short and long run. It is clear that the influence 
of energy own-price elasticities in the short run is lower in absolute value than in the 
long run. Dahl (1993) provides estimates for short-run residential electricity own-price 
elasticity ranging between 0.14 and 0.44.  Bernstein & Griffin (2005), and Hsing (1994) 
provide long-run estimates for price elasticity related to residential electricity in the 
0.32-1.89 range. Those values describe a situation where consumers, in the short run, 
may increase energy consumption as the cost of energy drops and as cost reduction 




2.2.4 Indirect rebound effect 
The indirect rebound effect occurs when there is an increase in energy consumption 
from the consumption of other energy services when efficiency 𝜂11 improves. The 
indirect rebound effect is due to the income and substitution effect on all the other 
energy services 𝑠2. It can be defined as the direct rebound effect, in terms of elasticities, 
as 𝜀𝑓22,𝜂11 or equivalently,  𝜀𝑠2,𝜂11 .  Energy services 𝑠2 will increase with an increase in 
efficiency 𝜂11 if  𝑠2 is a complement service for 𝑠1. Respectively, energy service  𝑠2 will 
decrease with an increase in efficiency 𝜂11 if energy service 𝑠2 is a substitute service 
for 𝑠1. The indirect rebound effect is challenging to estimate and has received 
considerably less attention in the empirical literature. 
 
2.2.5 Total rebound effect   
Let’s assume that the utility function is modeled only by the quantity of energy service, 
s, and non-energy service, x. A consumer would allocate disposable income between x 
and 𝑠  in order to maximize utility. The associated utility maximization problem 
is max
𝑥,𝑠
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠). An indifference curve would represent all bundles of (x,s) that yield the 
same utility. In the consumer’s utility maximization model, the rebound effect is an 
outcome of the following process. As technological innovation improves efficiency, the 
relative cost of the service provided decreases. For example, efficient lighting decreases 
the cost of operation. Illumination would be consumed in lower per unit price. As a 
result, a consumer chooses a new optimal bundle, consistent to the new relative prices. 
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The change in the price of energy services has two effects on the demand of service. 
The service becomes cheaper relative to other goods which leads to a substitution effect. 
Secondly, the disposable income increases leading to an income effect. The magnitude 
of the rebound effect is related to the price elasticity of the service. Consumer disposes 
the available income in two commodities or services, x and 𝑠, conditional on the initial 
prices of 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑠𝐴. The consumer maximizes utility 𝑈𝐴 at given prices and income 






Figure 4: Consumer’s total rebound effect. 
Let’s assume that  𝑠𝐵 represents energy services of an equipment that has improved and 
become more energy efficient. As a result, the cost of energy services has decreased. If 
a consumer had to spend all available income on commodity x, they could still buy the 
same amount. However, if a consumer had to spend all disposable income on service 𝑠, 
they could buy more of the services.   
Under the new decreased cost for energy services, 𝑠, 𝑎 consumer will move the optimal 
choice from point A to point B and shift the bundle of choices to a new indifference 
curve, with a higher level of utility. The consumer will increase energy consumption 





           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           























2.2.6 The producer of energy services 
Typically, investments in EE involves spending more initial capital and achieving 
lower future energy operating costs. The initial investment cost is the difference 
between the purchase of a more efficient product and the cost of a conventional 
product, that provides the same services but requires a larger input of energy. The 
decision of whether it is preferable to invest in EE requires an assessment, in present 
values, of the initial cost of investments and expected future savings.  However, 
comparing expected future energy expenditures to initial investment cost is a rather 
complex process. Expectations and assumptions must be stated in relation to future 
energy prices, discounting rates for future cash flows, changes to operation costs, the 
intensity of operation, and finally, a product’s lifecycle. The decision for optimal 
investments in EE would minimize the present value of costs. This is described in the 
framework of a production function (Figure 5) where initial capital and energy 
consumption are viewed as inputs into the production of energy services.  
An isoquant represents all factor combinations that are capable of producing the same 
level of output. Along an isoquant, the producer would be indifferent between 
combinations of input of capital (K) and energy (E).  The cost-minimizing level of 
energy use is found at the point of tangency, where the marginal increase in capital 
cost, with respect to energy reduction, is equal to their relative price, in present-value 
terms. Producers of energy services may move along the energy-service isoquant by 
substituting capital for energy, in response to a change in relative prices. In those 
terms, isoquants are similar to indifferent curves of the theory of consumer’s behavior. 
Figure 1 illustrates an example where relative prices change from 𝑃0 to 𝑃1. Both 
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production choices provide the same units of outputs. However, as the producer moves 
from 𝑃0 to 𝑃1, the cost allocation between capital and energy changes. At 𝑃1, the 
producer invests additional resources in the initial capital with an expectation to 
decrease energy costs. 
As technology improves, the ‘new’ production function may shift the isoquant in a 
way favoring higher levels of EE. This is illustrated in figure6 where new production 
possibilities, available for the producer, are given in the isoquant 1. Typically, a lower 
isoquant would indicate a lower level of output. However, this is not the case with 
isoquant 1. Advances in technology make capital more energy efficient. Therefore, 
given the same amount of capital, less energy is needed to produce the initial output 
level.  
This transition to a more efficient capital investment, is described in figure 7. As 
technology improves and innovative products enter the marketplace, the isoquant 0 
shifts to the left. Initially, at isoquant 0,  the producer minimizes costs at (𝐸0, 𝐾0).  
After the efficiency improvement in capital investments, the producer may achieve 
energy conservation by moving from  𝐸0 to 𝐸1.  This however isn’t an optimal 
decision choice for the producer. Realizing the benefits of the new production 
combination, the producer will eventually replace capital for energy because energy 
































































































2.2.7 Welfare implications of the rebound effect  
The welfare implications of the rebound effect are analytically discussed in the 
academic literature (Chan & Gillingham, 2015) (Borenstein, 2013) (Saunders & Tsao, 
2012) (Gillingham & Palmer, 2014) (Otto, Kaiser, & Arnold, 2014). This section gives 
a brief summary of the theoretical conditions under which the rebound effect can be 
beneficial or undesirable. The analysis provided supports the basic economic concept 
that overall welfare is conditional on the relative costs and benefits of the additional 
service provided. 
Using the notation already defined in the section of the direct rebound effect (2.2.3), 
the social welfare (sW) is defined as the aggregate utility used from the economic 
agents while accounting for negative externalities: 
The social welfare is sW = 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠1, 𝑠2) – ExC  (4) 
ExC represents the total externalities from the additional usage of energy services, and 
costs are given by ExC = k(𝑒1𝑓11 + 𝑒2𝑓22 +  𝑐1𝑠1 + 𝑐2𝑠2). Here, k represents the 
population of identical consumers,  𝑒𝑖  represents the fuel’s marginal external cost 
(e.g., from environmental pollution), and 𝑐𝑖  represents the service’s marginal external 
cost (e.g., from traffic congestion).  
Expression (4) does not account for the cost of the energy improvements. In case there 
is a cost associated with energy efficiency improvements, the net change in social 
welfare, on the margin, would be the difference between that cost and expression (4). 
Derivatives of the concept described are the following propositions: 
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Proposition 1: In the absence of negative external costs, an energy efficiency 
improvement necessarily improves social welfare. 
Proposition 2: The direct rebound effect may increase or decrease overall welfare.  
 
2.2.8 Welfare implications of energy efficiency improvements   
The most commonly examined benefit of energy efficiency programs is a reduction in 
energy use. We assume that when doubling the efficacy of a lighting system, only half 
as much electricity is required to provide the same level of illumination. From this 
perspective, a less-than-proportional reduction in energy use is viewed as a failure of 
programs to increase energy efficiency.  
However, it is often overlooked that an increase in energy efficiency can elicit changes 
in consumer's behavior such that an increase in energy efficiency does not lead to a 
proportional reduction in energy consumption.  
This perspective ignores the fact that increasing energy efficiency also reduces the 
effective cost of energy services, which could elicit a behavioral response. For 
example, doubling automobile fuel mileage reduces the cost per mile traveled, and 
unless the price elasticity demand for automobile travel is zero, we can expect that 
more miles will be driven. A downward sloping demand for energy services implies 
this rebound effect. With the rebound effect, energy use is reduced less than in 
proportion to the increase in efficiency. However, there is also an increase in the 
energy services which also must be considered to be a social benefit.  
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Consider the example of replacing High-Pressure Sodium (HPS) highway lights with 
LED lighting in Rhode Island.  LED lights provide an equivalent level of light while 
consuming 40-80% less electricity.  In this specific example, the Rhode Island 
Department of Transportation, in cooperation with the RI Office of Energy Resources, 
chose a solution that lead to energy savings of 47%. This solution maintained, and in 
many cases, improved the previous levels of highway lighting. The improvement also 
implies that the energy investment in new lighting reduced 47% the effective energy 
"price" of providing highway lighting. Given the new lower effective price of lighting, 
the agency (RIDOT) might choose to improve highway safety by lighting previously 
dark sections of highways. In fact, soon after the completion of the lighting project in 
2017, RIDOT decided to increase the hours of operation for the highway lighting. In 
the past, several areas of the road network were under a lighting ‘curfew’ between 
1:00 AM and 5:00 AM. Realizing the benefits of the reduced operating cost, RIDOT 
removed the curfew.      
For purposes of this example, suppose the agency increased highway safety by 
increasing the hours highway lights were on by 32%.  The change in hours of 
operation implies that the amount of electricity consumed is reduced by 30% = (1-(1-
0.47)*(1.32)) while simultaneously increasing public safety by providing better 
highway lighting.  In this example, the rebound effect implies that electricity use is 
reduced less than proportional to the increase in energy efficiency (30% rather than 
47%), but society also benefits from improved highway safety.  
Therefore, the presence of a rebound effect does not imply a failure of energy 
efficiency programs, but rather it determines the extent to which social benefits are 
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allocated among energy savings vs. increased energy services supplied. To properly 
evaluate the welfare effects of increases in energy efficiency, one needs to consider 
both energy savings and societal benefits from increased energy services.   
Determining the sign of the ultimate welfare effect can be complex as it depends on the 
relative sizes of the values of energy services, fuel savings, and any external effects, 
such as pollution emissions and impacts on traffic.  In some cases, such as automobile 
efficiency, external effects may be substantial, while in others such as highway lighting, 
external effects may be fairly small. But in general, many of these effects are difficult 
to quantify and express in monetary terms. 
The most fundamental measurement when debating the merits of EE improvement in 
electricity, spurred by efficiency programs, is whether the rebound effect cancels the 
overall expected welfare implications. The question that arises next is: Why not conduct 
an analysis of energy efficiency policies by first examining the cost of the EE programs 
and then compare the net benefits including the rebound to the net gains? This is a valid 
question because as previously described in this study, net benefits of electricity EE 
programs such as expected energy savings may not be fully realized due to rebound 
effects. But as articles such as that of (Azevedo, 2014) have shown “There is still 
significant ambiguity about how the rebound effect should be defined, how we can 
measure it, and how we can characterize its uncertainty” (p.1). Other similar studies, 
with analogous findings, have contributed to increasing negative perceptions that these 
rebound effects may have. These results may influence decisions on future energy 
policies regarding EE programs. When there are large energy service externalities, as a 
49 
 
result of the rebound, the social welfare is more likely to decrease with an improvement 
in energy efficiency. One classic example is traffic congestion in city centers.  
In the case that the direct rebound effect and external costs of service are large, the 
energy efficiency improvements are more likely to decrease social welfare. 
Respectively, when the direct rebound effect and externalities are small, the energy 
efficiency improvements are more likely to increase social welfare. When this occurs 
and energy consumption increases, welfare may improve only if the consumer surplus 
from energy service consumption is greatly valuable (Chan & Gillingham, 2015). 
Despite such offsets, all findings that may affect policymakers’ decisions to support new 
electricity energy efficiency policies must be evaluated in the general context of social 
welfare. In this context, it must be examined to what extent electricity EE improvements 
and their multiple goals are indirectly contributing positively to the overall welfare. For 
example, unlike the results of rebound effects in the case of the development and 
adoption of fuel-efficient automobiles, which increase the amount of miles driven and 
therefore traffic and accidents, electricity efficiency improvements such as public 
lighting, heating and air-conditioning lack such externalities (Alfawzan & Gasim, 
2017). In recent publications, increasing importance has been given to the theory that 
EE programs have a fundamental impact on what is called multiple benefits outcomes 
that contribute to welfare-enhancing macroeconomic benefits. Depending on the 
magnitude of the rebound effect, these implications on social welfare fuel the human 
ambition to improve welfare and wealth (IEA, 2014). Nevertheless, the attempt to 
quantify the benefits and costs of the rebound effect in order to estimate their impact on 
the welfare implications of energy efficiency is very complicated. Researchers such as 
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Chan & Gillingham (2015), point out that the exact mechanism of how rebound 
influences the welfare implications of energy efficiency has “not been addressed in the 
literature” (p.25). There is a need for reasonable real-world estimates that take into 
consideration environmental externalities. According to the literature, quantifying 
environmental externalities is extremely difficult even when trying to access the welfare 
implications of the direct rebound effect in the driving habits of fuel-efficient 
automobiles (Parry & Small, 2005). For the purposes of this study, a brief description 
of four fundamental welfare implications is examined: energy security, health benefits, 
asset values, and disposable income. 
 
Energy security 
In the literature review of this thesis, the concept of energy security was introduced as 
a precursor to fundamental policy changes that lead to the dawn of EE programs for 
electricity. Today there is a modern concept of energy security that involves climate 
change and lays out the basic conditions for human prosperity. Some researchers like 
Gracceva & Zeniewski, (2014) claim that energy security is a product of the interactions 
and interdependencies of a complex system (Gracceva & Zeniewski, 2014). Gallagher 
& Appenzeller state that the energy system complexities are such ‘‘whose properties are 
not fully explained by an understanding of its component parts’’ (p. 89). Energy security, 
therefore, is a product of many diverse attributes, but some researchers like Ecofys 
(2009) have provided a three-tier categorization scheme: Extreme events, inadequate 
market structures, and supply shortfall. Out of the three categories of energy security 
risks as defined by Ecofys (2009), the latter two are well within EE program planning. 
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When EE improvements are well thought, they promote liberalization of generation 
resources that in turn create well-functioning, distortion-free electricity markets. 
Integrated power grids are also responsible for bringing to the consumer the best use of 
generation resources. It could be argued that even this improvement of supply stemmed 
from competition and increased customer choice may even provide resources for the 
first of the three categories of energy security risks mentioned above: Extreme events. 
 
Health benefits 
According to a study prepared by the Energy Efficiency Unit, Directorate for 
Sustainable Policy and Technology, of the International Energy Agency (IEA), there are 
well-documented benefits such as improved health and well-being (IEA, 2014). These 
benefits range from reduced respiratory disease symptoms to mental health impacts such 
as anxiety, stress, and depression. The worry alone about physical health well-being 
affects the overall health of citizens. More and better public lighting, for example, 
generates indirect positive social impacts that in turn reduce spending on public health 
budgets. 
 
Asset values  
High energy costs in the EU have prompted via European Union directives a multitude 
of electricity EE programs that were in turn eagerly adopted by consumers. Today, each 
building must display a plaque reporting the energy proficiency score. The properties 
that were made more efficient gained in value significantly. Respectively, similar trends 
are beginning to appear in the U.S. where an increase in property values. There is 
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evidence that EE has a positive effect on both the sales and rental prices of properties 
(Hyland, Ronan, & Lyons, 2013).   
 
Disposable income 
It has been well documented that EE electricity programs benefit households that have 
access to a wider energy efficiency increase. According to Azevedo, (2014): If the 
energy efficiency measure being pursued saves money to the consumers over its 
lifetime, this means the consumer would actually experience a net increase in income. 
She might then use some of that income to increase her consumption of that same energy 
service, but the rest of it will be spent on other goods and services (or allocated to 
savings for future consumption). Some of these goods and services may have large 
energy or carbon footprint, whereas others will not (p. 6). However, in many (but not 
all) cases, more energy efficient appliances require a higher up-front investment, so 
there is a tradeoff between the cost of the appliance vs. energy use. But energy star 
appliances will typically be more expensive to purchase. Low-income individuals are 
likely to be at a disadvantage in the cases of higher upfront costs, even when energy 
saving pay off in the long run. 
To reduce consumer expenditure of saved income on goods and services that have large 
energy or carbon footprint future energy efficiency policies could be drafted in such a 
way that would target decision making, for example, the offering of discounts on 
specific items such as more EE technologies. 
The  conclusion is that we know for a fact that EE improvements have a cost and 
consumption changes that can be both adding to the overall welfare or reducing the 
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overall welfare. The impact of energy efficiency produces outcome at different levels of 
the economy. An investment takes place initially at the individual level in a household 
or in an enterprise. However, the outcome of EE impacts the economy as a whole. 
Targeted decisions at the individual level, as an outcome of EE incentive programs, may 
trigger developments in the local economy. Any future findings from research are bound 




Chapter 3. Methodology 
This chapter presents the methods used to analyze two empirical applications that 
examine energy efficiency (EE) incentive programs and concludes with the presentation 
of the methodology of the levelized cost of electricity and the datasets used. 
The methodology analyzing the first empirical application was designed to examine the 
effectiveness of stated versus observed electricity savings, at the national level (US), as 
a result of EE incentive programs. The methodology of the second empirical application 
examines how an aggressive EE incentive program performs in comparison to moderate 
EE programs when implemented at the state level. A comparison between the 
methodologies of DiD and SCM is also employed. This chapter also presents the 
datasets used in the analysis and a brief presentation of the energy profile of the states 
used. Finally, the levelized cost of electricity is presented to provide a measure of 
comparison between the cost of renewable energy electricity supply and the cost of  EE 
conservation. 
3.1 First Empirical Application – National level analysis 
The methodology of the first empirical application compares stipulated and observed 
energy savings due to the implementation of E.E. programs, at the national level. To 
identify whether there are discrepancies in the magnitude of the energy savings, that 
influence the cost of energy efficiency, the study aggregates the reported costs and 
savings of EE programs at the national level and estimates the weighted average cost 
of every unit of electricity saved. The reported values from this methodology represent 
the estimates that utilities provide using the analogical reasoning methodology to 
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evaluate the impact in electricity consumption, using the engineering estimates of their 
programs.  
As introduced in the theoretical framework section, the concept of analogical reasoning 
is utilized to explain the expectation that increasing spending on EE programs will 
deliver an analogous increase in energy savings. The reasoning by analogy approach is 
dominant in the energy market today and drives programs, policies, and expectations. 
In order to evaluate the validity of the reasoning by analogy approach, this research also 
assesses energy savings from the first economic principles angle, based on observed 
energy consumption.  
3.1.1 Data sources of first empirical level 
The data used for this empirical application are a collection of three large groups of 
time series. Energy data were obtained from the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), demographic data from American Community Survey (ACS) and climate data 
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
Monthly panel data for energy demand and prices of electricity were collected and 
analyzed for a period of eleven years, specifically from 2005 to 2015. Table 1 
summarizes the program cost for implementation of EE programs for this period. The 
programmatic costs are divided as follows: customer incentives represent 55%, while 
other costs, including administrative expenditures, represent 45%. The share of funds 
dedicated to customer incentives appears to be increasing over time, which is 
encouraging to observe. In other words, the share of benefits provided directly to 
consumers in the form of cash payments, subsidies to appliances, energy audits and 
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design services has increased in comparison to administrative, marketing, monitoring, 
evaluation costs, and utility-earned incentives. Table 2 provides insights into the cost 
of the expected incremental, annual savings of EE programs. However, there is no 
clear trend of the performance of the programs. The average cost for the examined 
period is $0.22 per incremental kWh saved. Some would expect that as program 
implementation develops, there would be an increase of the cost per kWh saved, as 
low-hanging fruit opportunities become exhausted. This outcome can be interpreted as 
an indication that across all states there are still opportunities for cost-effective 
investment in EE.  Table 3 presents annual electricity total consumption for the same 
examined period, 2005 to 2015. Table 4 provides further insights into the distribution 
of electricity consumption between the residential, commercial and the industrial 
sectors. It is observed that there is a downward trend in the industrial share of 
electricity demand across the examined period. The residential sector accounts for the 
biggest portion of the total electricity demand during the eleven years (Table 4 and 5). 
Table 11 presents nation-wide average electricity prices for the same period in which 
the average cost per kWh remains stable at about $0.10.  However, in figure 14, it is 
observed that demand differs significantly, creating four geographic clusters across the 
US. 
Efficiency related savings were obtained by the EIA and are part of the information 
that electric utilities report via form EIA-861 to the federal government. This form 
captures energy efficiency data regarding programs implemented within every state. 
More than 700 utilities, representing 1/5 of the total number in the US, implement and 
report information related to the results of EE programs. Electricity savings are 
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reported annually, for both incremental and total savings. Incremental annual savings, 
summarize the expected effect in demand, in terms of MWh for each utility, caused by 
new participants in existing programs, and all participants in new programs, during a 
given year. Reported incremental savings are annualized to reflect the program 
implementation effect if participants had initiated program participation on Jan 1.  
Within all programs, during a given year, in addition to the incremental effects, annual 
effects are also reported to reflect electricity savings achieved by existing and new 
participants. The effect is evaluated based on the start-up dates. For example, if 
participation took place on November 1st, only two months of savings are reported and 
reflect the useful life cycle of efficiency measures. 
Since the year 2013, utilities have also reported life cycle incremental effects. The new 
variable reflects the number of years the program is planned to exist and includes all 
anticipated future savings, as well as reporting annual savings. For example, if a 
project has an anticipated life of 6 years, with savings during each year of 1,000 
MWh, the reported incremental life cycle effect will be 6,000 MWh. For the period of 
the analysis, we observe that total annual savings are a multiple of the incremental 
savings with a multiplier that ranges from 9 to 10.6. This is an indication that 
electricity savings succeeded, in any given year, in having a more permanent impact. 
The second dataset, demographic data, were collected to control for factors that may 
affect energy use. Population, GSP, type of housing, percent of vacant housing units, 
and percent of housing units that use electricity for heating. Table 23 presents the 
collected demographic variables. 
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The third dataset, climate data, were used to control for weather fluctuations. Since 
energy consumption depends on weather conditions, degree days were chosen to be 
used as the most common indicator to estimate demand for space cooling and heating. 
The variation of winter conditions is controlled for by heating degree days (HDD), and 
the respectively warm weather is controlled for by cooling degree days (CDD). Both 
indicators (HDD and CDD) are defined to a base temperature of 65° F, which is 
suitable for human comfort (Rosa, Bianco, Scarpa, & Tagliafico, 2004). Degree days 
are the number of degrees in Fahrenheit that deviates from the base temperature 
(65°F) as compared to a day’s mean, outside air temperature.  The amount of degree 
days is proportional to the amount of energy needed to heat or cool a building. The 
inclusion of heating and cooling degree days, in this model, as independent variables, 
control for weather fluctuation and the estimated coefficients of both variables are 
statistically significant.  
In addition to the independent variables described above, the model specification in 
the regression includes panel fixed effects or each state that controls for climate 
differences among states and year fixed effects that capture annual weather trends. 
Both HDD and CDD variables are defined in a log-level relationship to the dependent 
variable. Energy intensity was logarithmically transformed when degree days are 




3.1.2 Modeling electricity saving reported from utilities 
There is an extensive number of evaluation reports that estimate costs and electricity 
savings as a result of investments in energy efficiency. The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) is the source of raw data for the majority of the studies. The EIA 
reports the performance of the EE programs based on data provided by utility 
companies, annually. The EIA is part of the U.S. Department of Energy and is the 
principal agency of the U.S. federal statistical system. In order to conduct this 
research, raw data from EIA were also utilized. The model is derived from weighted 
measures of average savings and costs and those datasets as reported by electric 
utilities (EIA Form-861).   
This section frames the calculation of savings and costs based on the following 
notation. Let n index utilities such as n=1…N. Let t index years such as t=1…T. The 
nth electric utility reports savings (S) as a result of program implementation in 
t=1…𝑇𝑛 years.  However, not all utilities report savings in all 11 years. The same 
concept follows the notation for sales (D) and program costs (C). Electricity 
consumption that is reported before the utility invests in EE is reported MWh (0) and 
after the implementation MWh (1). Electricity savings are 𝑆𝑛𝑡 and 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 =
 𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡 − 𝑆𝑛𝑡 
To calculate the average per unit costs and savings, a weighted average measure was 
introduced following the equations (1) and (2). The results are reported in both 
discounted and non-discounted costs. 
Electricity Savings (S) = 
∑  𝑁𝑛=1 ∑ (𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡 − 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 )
𝑇𝑛
𝑡=1
∑  𝑁𝑛=1 ∑ 𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡 
𝑇𝑛
𝑡=1




Energy Efficiency Program Costs (C) = 
∑  𝑁𝑛=1 ∑ 𝐶𝑛𝑡 
𝑇𝑛
𝑡=1




Equations (1) and (2) summarize the average weighted savings and costs from n utility 
over a period T and can be illustrated using a simple example. Suppose two utilities, A 
and B, spend (C) in year t=1, on Energy Efficiency programs, $1 million and $10 
million, respectively. One year after implementing the program, utility A reports 
electricity savings of 20,000 MWh and sales of 900,000 MWh. Utility B reports 
electricity savings of 500,000 MWh and sales of 8,500,000 MWh. Following the 
notation described above, utility A: distributed 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1) =900,000 MWh of electricity 
instead of 𝑀𝑊ℎ(0) =920,000 MWh.  
Accordingly, utility B distributed 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1) =8,500,000 MWh of electricity instead of 
𝑀𝑊ℎ(0) =9,000,000 MWh. Based on the example above the estimated percent 
savings and costs per savings from utilities A and B are:  








per MWh saved or 2.1 cents per kWh. 
The above example is based on the assumption that 𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡  is derived from the 
observed 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 − 𝑆𝑛𝑡. 
However, the above calculation which is based on utility stipulated energy savings, 
does not control for selection bias as described by Braithwait & Caves (1994) and is a 
principal economic concern that relates with subsidies (Hartman, 1988). Selection bias 
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arises from the fact that treated individuals differ from non-treated for a reason or 
reasons other than treatment status. In addition, this modeling does not account for 
increased energy usage as a response to the reduced energy cost; the rebound effect 
(Gillingham, Rapson, & Wagner, 2015). Finally, this model omits to compare energy 
savings to an unbiased baseline which is essential to draw a meaningful conclusion. 
Due to all the above weaknesses, when ex-post assessments evaluate efficiency 
programs, the results tend to indicate that programs are constantly underperforming 
(Loughran & Kulick, 2004). 
 
3.1.3 Modeling electricity savings using observed electricity consumption  
This model assesses observed electricity usage and estimates the impact EE programs 
have on the reduction of electricity consumption, based on the econometric analysis. It 
evaluates how the observed electricity consumption differs after implementing an 
energy efficiency program for the ultimate purpose of assessing energy savings, which 
derive from an energy efficiency program. This analysis identifies if there is a solid 
ground for skepticism regarding the electricity reported savings and controls for the 
limitations described above. The model utilizes an observed, and easy to evaluate 
variable, electricity consumption, as a proxy for energy efficiency. However, the level 
of consumption without an EE program implemented is not observable. Therefore, it is 
necessary to construct an estimate of what the electricity consumption would have 
been without the EE program in place. This model forecasts energy consumption 
without the EE program in place, controlling for the number of customers, and the 
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gross state product (GSP). In the developed econometric model, the dependent 
variable is the logarithmic transformation of electricity consumption and can be 
explained as energy intensity. 
Panel data and fixed effects (FE) are introduced in analyzing the impact of the utility 
expenditure for rebates. Fixed effects allow the model to control for variables we 
cannot observe, or measure, such as behavioral or cultural, across states; and other 
variables that may change over time, but not across states, such as national and federal 
regulations.  The analysis with FE panel data will also account for individual and 
household heterogeneity. The independent variables are the EE program cost, the 
energy cost, the average income, other demographics, and temperature in degree days. 
The study calculates the impact of utility spending for EE on overall energy 
consumption. The changes in electricity consumption are defined as: 
 𝛥𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑛𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡- 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡−1   (3)  
and identified econometrically from specification described in equation (4) 
𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡=𝛽1  𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽2+ 𝛸𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽3+ 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽3 +𝜇𝑖+𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (4) 
where:  
𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡: is the log electricity sales for utility i located in state j in year t 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡: is the log expenditure for EE programs for utility i in state j in year t  
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡: number of customers for utility i located in state j in year t 
𝛸𝑖𝑗𝑡: is a vector of utility − level covariates 
𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡: is a vector of state − level covariates 
𝜇𝑖, 𝜈𝑡 , 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡: Utility and year fixed effects- and potentially heteroskedastic error term. 
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The primary goal is to isolate the impact of EE programs spending on electricity 
demand, which is represented by 1 in the equation above. Examining energy 
consumption, as the focus for addressing issues surrounding energy efficiency, is not 
something new. Studies have provided useful insights, introducing a methodology that 
utilizes energy intensity, to examine policies at the state level that have contributed to 
energy efficiency (Bernstein et al., 2003; Loughran and Kulick, 2004). Loughran & 
Kulick (2004), expanded the framework of Bernstein’s et al., and introduced a more 
sophisticated econometric model. They concluded that expenditure for energy 
efficiency has a much smaller effect on energy consumption than utilities reported. 
The interpretation of  𝛽1 is the effect of energy efficiency programs on electricity 
consumption and is the primary objective of this model. In the examined log-log 
regression specification of equation (4) the coefficient 𝛽1 is an elasticity. 
 
3.2 Second Empirical Application - State level analysis 
The second empirical application examines the cost-effectiveness of state-specific EE 
programs. Traditionally, utility’s revenues were completely dependent upon selling 
electricity. With decoupling programs discussed above in Section 2.1.8, energy pricing 
structures were revised to provide a mechanism for rewarding utilities for helping 
bring about energy conservation measures.  Energy efficiency has great potential to 
meet energy demand at low cost, while simultaneously reducing may externalities, 
such as pollution emissions.  A proper policy would increase investments in energy 
efficiency, starting with the most cost-effective energy efficiency actions, and 
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proceeding to increasingly expensive actions until the marginal cost of reducing 
energy demand is equal to the cost of producing energy.  Thus, the cost-effective 
policy is based on identifying the proper balance between reduced energy use and 
clean energy production.  The second empirical application examines the cost-
effectiveness of state-specific EE programs. The developed econometric methodology, 
for the second empirical application, compares whether there is a statistically 
significant difference between the efficiency performance of states with aggressive EE 
programs compared to states with moderate programs. For the purposes of this study, 
the State of Rhode Island was assessed as the state with the most aggressive EE 
program in the US and was compared to the states of New Hampshire and Maine, that 
have adopted moderate EE programs.  
The differential effect of EE program implementation, also known as the treatment 
effect, is examined in the context of two econometric methodologies.  
Specifically, the difference in differences (DiD) methodology and the synthetic control 
method (SCM) are implemented to evaluate effectiveness. Using the state of Rhode 
Island as the treated unit, both methodologies evaluate the impact of aggressive EE 
programs. A comparison between the methodologies of DiD and SCM is also 
employed to illustrate the methodological advantages of each method. The energy 
profile of the three states examined in the second empirical application, Rhode Island, 




3.2.1 State energy policy 
States strive to provide reliable, cost-effective electricity sustainably. With these 
prerequisites in mind, they strive to deliver a safe, uninterrupted energy supply that 
meets the environmental standards of the communities they serve. Successful energy 
policy needs to promote cost-effective energy resources, to assist the production 
process, and enhance the well-being of the public. However, from a policy 
perspective, the situation isn’t straightforward because reliable energy isn’t always 
clean and clean energy is not always the least costly. Reliable energy supply is the one 
that is always available to meet demand needs. However, renewable energy, without 
storage, struggles to meet this definition of reliability, with the possible exception of 
hydropower. Wind and sun are not available on all days and at all hours of the year. A 
combination of renewable energy and energy storage is a promising solution that still 
has many limitations, both technological and financial. On the other hand, fossil fuels 
are reliable but are not clean, and are themselves finite resources.  
The final factor to be consider is the cost. Energy resources are commodities that are 
subject to continuous price fluctuations. It is understood that the path to a reliable, 
clean, low-cost energy supply is dynamic. Technological and political interactions 
continuously affect the energy model for demand and supply.  
This section examines EE electricity programs to provide insights into the 
expectations of energy policies on the demand side of the electricity market.  
To achieve this, as explained previously, the electricity markets examined are in New 
England. Specifically, the states of Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Maine. All 
three operate under the same wholesale electricity market, the Independent System 
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Operator of New England (ISO-NE), which is an independent, nonprofit entity that 
serves six states: Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and 
Connecticut. ISO-NE’s objective is to administer New England’s wholesale electricity 
markets and provide services for reliability planning for the region's electricity system 
(ISO, 2017).  
The states face very similar wholesale electricity prices, with minor differences 
resulting from transmission system conditions, such as line congestion and losses. 
Empirically, in this study, it was estimated that the magnitude of the difference in 
wholesale electricity prices, is less than 5%, across the three states.  
This presentation of the state’s energy profile contributes to the understanding of the 
energy efficiency policies that are implemented in the area with the highest electricity 
costs in the US. By examining a period of 11 years, from 2005 to 2015, and focusing 
on the state with the highest EE program spending in the US per capita, valuable 
insights are gained for the policy arena. Lastly, the specification of the methodology 
that is designed to examine three periods provides further information about the 
temporal performance of the programs.  
 
3.2.2 State of Rhode Island energy profile 
The Ocean State is the nation’s smallest state and the second-most densely populated, 
after New Jersey. Located in the New England region of the Northeastern United 
States, it is the state with the second lowest per capita energy consumption in the 
nation, after the state of New York (Table 18: Total Energy Consumed per Capita, 
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2015 (million Btu). Rhode Island doesn’t have any fossil fuel resources and is the state 
with the first offshore wind turbine installation in the US.  The Ocean State’s cutting-
edge policies in energy go back to the 1990s. The state developed the first system 
benefit fund to lead efforts for demand-side management and renewable energy in 
1993. The fund collected over $15 million/year, for energy efficiency, and created a 
new market for investments in RI’s energy market.  In 2006, the State of Rhode 
Island’s General Assembly passed an energy bill known as “The Comprehensive 
Energy Conservation, Efficiency, and Affordability Act of 2006”. The law contains an 
innovative condition as part of the state’s principal least cost procurement mandate 
(R.I.Gen.Law.S39-1-27.7, 2016). According to the law, RI’s approach to meet the 
state’s energy needs is to prioritize investments in energy efficiency and energy 
conservation measures that are “prudent and reliable and when such measures are 
lower than the acquisition of additional supply.”  
The Comprehensive Energy Efficiency, Conservation, and Affordability Act of 2006 
further transformed the energy efficiency market in Rhode Island. The concept of 
Least Cost Procurement (LCP) established new standards in energy efficiency 
investment decisions. The new objective is to implement EE investments on an 
economic basis rather than placing a cap on investments for budgetary or other 
purposes. The criterion for implementing an EE program is that the program be cost-
effective. The cost-effectiveness is identified simply as the ratio of the net present 
value of the benefits to the net present value of the costs. The proposed EE programs, 
therefore, must have a cost lower than the cost of the acquisition of additional supply.   
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In practice, LCP required Rhode Island’s utilities to invest in cost-effective energy 
efficiency that is less expensive than supply. The result is that 10 years later, RI is the 
state with the highest reported electricity savings due to EE programs in the nation, 
reporting statewide savings of 2.91% as a percent of 2015 retail sales - Table 24. To 
achieve these energy savings, RI utilities spent, for electric efficiency programs, $82.9 
million in 2015, which represents 6.34% of the statewide electricity revenues. The 
proceeds that finance the program are a product of a surcharge that all consumers pay 
monthly, through their electric bill. Rhode Island spends a greater proportion of utility 
revenues than any other state on EE programs due to the LCP requirements. The 
energy efficiency plans are overseen by a stakeholder group, the Energy Efficiency 
and Resource Management Council (EERMC), with representatives from government 
agencies, environmental groups, businesses, and consumer advocates. The EERMC 
was created by the 2006 Act and is charged with the supervision of energy efficiency 
programs. It is funded through the billing surcharge and has 13 voluntary 
members. The governor, with input from the state Senate, appoints nine voting 
members with expertise in areas such as law, the environment, energy codes, and 
representatives of end-users.  Four additional non-voting members represent the 
utilities and the delivered fuels industry.  The Commissioner of Rhode Island’s Office 
of Energy Resources serves as the EERMC’s Executive Director and Executive 
Secretary. SEO staff provides the Council with administrative services. The EERMC 
meetings are scheduled monthly and are open to the public. 
In addition to the EERMC, a stakeholder body, the Demand Collaborative, provides 
consistent and comprehensive contribution into the processes related to the delivery of 
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Least Cost Procurement. This group is convened by National Grid, which is the Rhode 
Island’s largest utility, to solicit feedback on program plans and implementation 
strategies.  
The EERMC has funding to retain independent, expert consultants that give technical 
assistance to Council members on LCP.  The consultants provide research and 
recommendations that help the Council in decision-making, program improvement, 
and independent verification of the cost-effectiveness of the National Grid’s plans. 
Direct Jobs in Energy Efficiency 8,112 
Electric Program Expenditures $84.73 million 
Gas Program Expenditures $21.5 million 
Per capita Expenditures $100.58 
Electric Savings 214,512 MWh 
Electric Savings as Percent of Retail Sales 2.8% 
Gas Savings 4.1 million therms 
Gas Savings as Percent of Retail Sales 1.01% 
 
Table 1: Rhode Island EE profile (2015) 
70 
 
3.2.3 State of New Hampshire energy profile 
New Hampshire is a state in the New England region of the northeastern United States 
bordered by Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, and the Canadian province of Quebec. 
New Hampshire covers an area of 9,351 sq.miles and, as of 2013, has a population of 
1.323,459 residents. The average state temperature is 46.3°F and has an annual snowfall 
of 61 inches. The state ranks 9th in the heating degree days in the nation (2015, Table 
8). New Hampshire has no fossil fuels, petroleum, natural gas, or coal reserves.  
The state’s electricity generation is provided as follows: just over 2% by two coal-fired 
electric power plants, about 25% by natural gas power-plants and more than 15% by 
renewable energy. Almost half of the state’s electricity generation comes from the 
Seabrook nuclear plant: the largest nuclear power generating unit in New England. The 
plant has a 1,244 MW generating capacity. Despite this output, per capita, residential 
petroleum consumption ranks among the highest in the US. This dependence is partially 
explained due to the cold winters. New Hampshire is a member of an independent,  
non-profit Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) named ISO New England Inc. 
(ISO-NE). The ISO-NE corporation oversees the entire New England power system.  





Direct Jobs in Energy Efficiency 6,833 
Electric Program Expenditures $25.8 million 
Gas Program Expenditures $7.1 million 
Per capita Expenditures $24.79 
Electric Savings 73,499 MWh 
Electric Savings as Percent of Retail Sales 0.67% 
Gas Savings 2.1 million therms 
Gas Savings as Percent of Retail Sales 0.70% 
 
Table 2:  New Hampshire EE profile 
New Hampshire Energy Efficiency program  
In 2005, New Hampshire became one of the seven signatory states of the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The New Hampshire Energy Efficiency program 
targets annual savings of 0.49%, of the electricity sales in 2015. The program funding 
according to the NH Statewide Energy Efficiency Plan is $26 million and the cost per 
lifetime kWh savings is $0.036. The program offered by NH electric utilities is funded 
by the System Benefit Charge (SBC), RGGI auction proceeds and revenues obtained by 
each of the NH electric utilities from the participation in the ISO-NE’s forward capacity 
market (FCM). The SBC is less than 0.2 cents per kWh, five times lower than the SBC 






3.2.4 State of Maine energy profile 
Maine is also located in the New England region bordering only with New Hampshire 
in the United States, and the Canadian provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick. Maine 
covers an area of 35,385 sq.miles, and as of 2016, has a population of 1,331,479 
residents. Three-fifths (60%) of the state’s population lives in rural areas, and it is the 
state with the lowest population density in New England. The average state temperature 
is 45.65°F and has an annual snowfall of 72 inches (US Climate data, 2017). The state 
ranks 6th in the heating degree days in the nation. More than five-sixths of Maine is still 
forested, and forest products are a major biomass resource, supplying wood-derived 
fuels such as wood pellets. Maine is the most petroleum-dependent state, for home 
heating, in New England (EIA, Primary Energy Consumption, 2015). 
The state’s electricity generation is provided as follows: Wind produces a little over 
12%,  hydroelectric dams 25%, and 25% is produced from biomass generators, using 
mainly wood waste products. In addition, over 30% of net generation comes from 
natural gas. The rest of Maine's net electricity generation comes from petroleum, coal, 
and solar power (U.S. EIA, Electric Power Monthly, 2015). Overall, 67% of Maine's net 
electricity generation comes from renewable sources. The state does not have fossil fuel 
reserves (petroleum, natural gas, coal).  
Maine is also a member of ISO New England Inc (ISO-NE). Maine is one of the 12 
States that allow combined heat and power as an eligible resource in EERS and 




As far as load-serving entities (LSEs), the state of Maine has placed this obligation on 
a third-party non-governmental entity (Steinberg & Zinaman, 2014).  
 
Electric Program Expenditures $45.5 million 
Gas Program Expenditures $1.1 million 
Per capita Expenditures $43.96 
Electric Savings 166,500 MWh 
Electric Savings as Percent of Retail Sales 1.39% 
Gas Savings 148,346 therms 
Gas Savings as Percent of Retail Sales 0.14% 
 
Table 3: Maine EE profile 
Maine Energy Efficiency program  
In 2005, Maine, like New Hampshire, became one of the seven signatory states of the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The Maine Energy Efficiency program 
targets annual electric savings of 20%, by 2020, with incremental saving targets of ~ 
1.6% per year for 2014-2016 and ~2.4%, per year, for 2017-2019. Efficiency Maine 





3.2.5 Difference in differences (DiD) methodology used in the second empirical model   
The second empirical application explores whether energy consumption (𝑌𝑖𝑡) is 
affected by different levels of spending for EE programs (𝐷𝑖𝑡). To determine this, the 
econometric methodology of the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator was 
selected. The DiD is favored when estimating causal effects in empirical economics 
because the derived estimations from this research design offer an alternative to reach 
unconfounded measures by controlling for unobserved variables and combining it with 
observed or complementary characteristics. The DiD integrates the advances of fixed 
effects estimators with causal inference analysis when unobserved events, or 
characteristics, confound the interpretations (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). According to 
Villa (2012), DiD has been used “widely when the evaluation of a given intervention 
entails the collection of panel data” (p.2). It is also used even when panel data is not 
required, in its simplest version. According to Mora and Reggio (2013), only data 
from two periods are needed: “In the first period the pre-treatment period none of the 
agents are exposed to the treatment. In the second period, the post-treatment period 
those labeled as treated are already exposed to treatment while those labeled as 
“controls” are not” (p.2).  
As stated by Lechner (2010), the DiD can calculate the results of an EE program 
intervention by using “the mean changes of the outcome variables for the nontreated 
over time and add them to the mean level of the outcome variable for the treated prior 
to treatment to obtain the mean outcome the treated would have experienced if they 
had not been subjected to the treatment” (p. 2). In our case, the specific intervention or 
treatment is the passage of a law by policymakers to subsidize EE. The model will 
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then compare the difference in outcomes before and after the intervention for groups 
exposed to the intervention to the same difference in unexposed groups; the control 
group. 
Card and Krueger’s (1994) study in labor economics is a representative and well-
known paper that demonstrates the DiD methodology. They collected employment 
data from fast food restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, in February 1992 and 
again in November 1992. The minimum wage in Pennsylvania stayed stable over this 
period. In New Jersey, the minimum wage increased. They used their data and the 
differences-in-differences methodology to estimate the effects of the increase of the 
minimum wage in employment. Pennsylvania’s set of observations was used as a 
control group to identify the effects of the salary increase in the treatment – the New 
Jersey – observations. The idea of using DiD to study the effect of minimum wage 
levels on employment was introduced many years prior, by Obenauer and Von Der 
Nienburg (1915).   
DiD in the empirical application 
In this study, the observed value of residential energy consumption is 𝑌𝑖𝑡  and can be 
assessed either as a control variable, 𝑌0𝑖𝑡 or a treated variable 𝑌1𝑖𝑡, depending on the 
treatment status.  Status 𝑌0𝑖𝑡 represents the non-treatment status for consumers served 
by utility (i) in period (t). It describes consumption in utilities with moderate EE 
program spending.  
The different levels of spending for EE programs (𝐷𝑖𝑡) are characterized as moderate 
or aggressive. This is a limitation of the method because it is applied to discrete, as 
opposed to continuous, levels of treatment. Another limitation is noted by Friedman 
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(2013), when referring to the working paper by Mora and Reggio (2013) in a post co-
written by the two explains that: “DiD-as-commonly-practiced implicitly involves 
other assumptions instead of Parallel Paths, assumptions perhaps unknown to the 
researcher, which may influence the estimate of the treatment effect. These 
assumptions concern the dynamics of the outcome of interest, both before and after the 
introduction of treatment, and the implications of the particular dynamic specification 
for the Parallel Paths assumption.” 
Fixed Effects 
Electricity consumption (𝑌𝑖𝑡) is also subject to fixed confounders 𝐴𝑖 such as behavior 
(fixed unit effects) and time varying covariates 𝑿𝒊𝒕 such as income, electricity price 
and weather conditions. Term 𝝀𝒕 denotes year effects that are common across all 
observations in period t.  
E[𝑌0𝑖𝑡: 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡, t] = α +𝜆𝑡 + 𝛢′𝑖𝛾 +𝛸′𝑖𝑡β  (1) 
Assuming that the causal effect of the status of an EE program is additive and constant 
we have: 
E[𝑌1𝑖𝑡: 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡, t] = E[𝑌0𝑖𝑡: 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡, t] + ρ (2) 
Together equation (1) and (2) imply that observed residential electricity consumption 
in treatment group 𝑌1𝑖𝑡 is: 
E[𝑌1𝑖𝑡: 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡, t] = α +𝜆𝑡 +𝝆𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝛢′𝑖𝛾 +𝛸′𝑖𝑡β   (3) 
Equation (3) implies that: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 +𝜆𝑡 +𝜌𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛸′𝑖𝑡β +𝜀𝑖𝑡  (4) 
Where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑌0𝑖𝑡 - E[𝑌0𝑖𝑡: 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡, t] and 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛢′𝑖𝛾 
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Differences in differences is a version of fixed effects estimation. In the case of EE 
programs, the notation is: 
𝑌1𝑖𝑠𝑡: Electricity consumption at utilities i, state s, time t, with aggressive EE program 
spending 
𝑌0𝑖𝑠𝑡: Electricity consumption at utilities i, state s, time t, with moderate EE program 
spending.  
However, in practice, we only observe one or the other treatment status. The 
assumption is that in the absence of aggressive EE program budget change, energy 
consumption is determined by the sum of a time-invariant state effect 𝛾𝑠, and a year 
effect 𝜆𝑡, that is common across the examined states. 
E[𝑌0𝑖𝑠𝑡|s,t]= 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡  (5) 
Let 𝐷𝑠𝑡be a binary (dummy) variable for aggressive EE budget programs and periods. 
Assuming E [𝑌1𝑖𝑠𝑡 − 𝑌0𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠, 𝑡] = δ is the treatment effect. Then observed energy 
consumption can be written:  
𝑌1𝑖𝑠𝑡= 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡+δ 𝐷𝑠𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 (5) 
The differences-in-differences strategy amounts to comparing the change in electricity 
consumption in areas with aggressive EE program spending, to the change in 
electricity consumption in areas with moderate program spending. Electricity 
consumption in areas with aggressive EE program spending (AG), before the 
implementation of the EE programs is described as:  
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝐴𝐺, 𝑡 = 0] = 𝛾𝐴𝐺 + 𝜆0 
The electricity consumption in AG after the implementation (t=1) is: 
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝐴𝐺, 𝑡 = 1] = 𝛾𝐴𝐺 + 𝜆1 + 𝜹 
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The difference between t=0 and t=1 is: 
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝐴𝐺, 𝑡 = 1] −  E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝐴𝐺, 𝑡 = 0] = 𝝀𝟏 - 𝝀𝟎+ δ 
The electricity consumption in areas with moderate EE program spending (MI), is 
described as:  
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝑀𝐼, 𝑡 = 0] = 𝛾𝑀𝐼 + 𝜆0 
The electricity consumption in MI during treatment period (t=1) is: 
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝑀𝐼, 𝑡 = 1] = 𝛾𝑀𝐼 + 𝜆1 + 𝜹 
The difference between t=0 and t=1 is: 
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝑀𝐼, 𝑡 = 1] −  E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝑀𝐼, 𝑡 = 0] = 𝝀𝟏 - 𝝀𝟎+ δ 
There are two assumptions for unbiased DiD estimation in addition to OLS 
requirements:   
1. There is a parallel trend in outcomes for both the control and treatment groups. 
2. There is no spillover effect.  
The parallel trend assumption is critical in the DiD model. It implies that in the 
absence of the intervention, both the control and treatment group would have the same 
differences in outcomes, over time. Visual observation of the outcomes in the pre-
treatment period would assist in identifying appropriate control groups. However, this 
necessary condition does not indicate that the same trend will continue during or after 
the treatment period. Lastly, spillover effects can invalidate the use of the DiD 




3.2.6 Synthetic control method used in the second empirical model   
Both the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) and the difference in differences approach, 
as described previously, aim to estimate the treatment effects of policy interventions 
that take place at an aggregate level, like a city or a state. While DiD assumes that the 
effect of unobserved confounders is constant over time, synthetic control tolerates 
confounders changing over time. Synthetic control was originally designed for case 
studies and is robust to the unobserved heterogeneity of confounders over time (Kreif, 
et al., 2016). The methodology used in synthetic control is to construct a control group 
that has similar pre-treatment features to the treated group. The method uses an 
optimized weighting procedure to get a better counterfactual for estimating the effect 
of an intervention. 
The SCM model is specified as follows: Suppose there is one treated unit, i, and n 
control units, j (j = 1, 2 … n). We consider a policy intervention with data sampled 
both before, and after, treatment. The pre-treatment periods are 𝑡 = 𝑡0, …, 𝑡𝑘, and the 
post-treatment periods are 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑘+1, …, 𝑇, so treatment happens between periods 𝑡𝑘 
and 𝑡𝑘+1,. Let 𝑌𝑖𝑡, denote an outcome in t for the treated unit, and let 𝑌𝑗𝑡 denote an 
outcome in period t for control unit j. 𝐗 is a vector of predictors (covariates). For i, the 
treatment effect,  𝑎𝑖𝑡, is measured as the difference between its post-treatment 
outcome, 𝑌𝑗𝑡, and its synthetic post-treatment outcome, 𝑌′𝑗𝑡 . 𝑌′𝑗𝑡 is a convex 
combination of the post-treatment outcomes of control units, 𝑌𝑗𝑡, defined by optimized 
weights, 𝑤′𝑗,: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖𝑡 · 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛸𝑖𝑡 · 𝛽𝑖 +𝜀𝑖𝑡  where 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = {
0, 𝑡 =  𝑡0, … . . , 𝑡𝑘
1, 𝑡 =  𝑡𝑘+1, … , 𝑇
  (5) 
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝛸𝑗𝑡 · 𝛽𝑗+𝜀𝑗𝑡   and 
 
𝑌′𝑖𝑡 =∑ 𝑤′𝑗  · 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
 = ∑ 𝑤′𝑗  
𝑛
𝑗=1
· [ 𝛸𝑗𝑡𝛽𝑗+𝜀𝑗𝑡]  (6) 
 
The treatment in the SCM model is the difference between the real treated unit, and its 
synthetic version, after the treatment as: 
𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌′𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤′𝑗  · 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
   t ≥ 𝑡𝑘+1  (7)   and     





The optimized weights, 𝑤′𝑗 , are obtained by minimizing the distance M between 𝚾𝐣, 
and 𝚾𝐣 · 𝐖𝐣 in the pre-intervention periods, according to: 
M= min
𝑤𝑗
[( 𝚾𝐢 - 𝚾𝐣 · 𝐖𝐣)'V(𝚾𝐢 − 𝚾𝐣 · 𝐖𝐣)]
𝟏
𝟐  t ∈ (𝑡𝑜,𝑡𝑘) 
Where the matrix, V, is positive, definite and chosen to minimize the mean squared 
prediction error (MSPE) with respect to pre-treatment outcomes only, conditional on 
values of wj∗. This process is what distinguishes SCM from a DiD approach, because 
control units are weighted according to the optimized 𝑤𝑗∗ , instead of a simple 
weighting of 𝑤𝑗 = 1/𝑁 (Wang, 2015).  
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3.2.7 Discussion of the econometric methodologies used in the second empirical 
model   
The difference-in-differences methodology and the synthetic control method (SCM) 
are both used to assess the differential effect of a treatment on a treatment group 
versus a control group. In the context of this study, both methodologies evaluate the 
effect of a sharp increase of EE programs in energy conservation, at the state level. 
Difference-in-differences estimators provide unbiased treatment effect estimates when, 
in the absence of treatment, the average outcomes for the treated, and control groups, 
would have followed parallel trends, over time. This assumption is implausible in 
many settings. 
The SCM evaluates treatment effects by constructing a weighted combination of 
control units, which represents what the treated group would have occurred in the 
absence of the treatment. While DiD estimation assumes that the effects of unobserved 
confounders are constant over time, the SCM allows for these effects to change over 
time, by re-weighting the control group so that it has similar pre-intervention 




3.3 Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) - Comparison 
Energy efficiency investments are not implemented in a vacuum. Proponents always 
compare the avoided cost of electricity to the cost of generating energy. The objective 
is to determine whether energy efficiency investments are cost-effective. This section 
provides information about the relative cost of generating electricity using different 
technologies. The objective is to develop an understanding of how the cost per unit of 
electricity changes over time and more specifically on how energy efficiency 
compares to electricity generation from renewable resources.  
The most common measure to compare different methods of electricity generation is 
the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). The LCOE is the break-even cost of a unit of 
electricity in present-value terms, over the lifetime of a generating asset.  It is 
estimated as the discounted sum of costs over the discounted sum of electricity 
produced over the lifetime of the investment:  
LCOE =
𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒













Where the sum of the costs is the investment (𝐼𝑡) expenditures over the expected 
lifetime (n) of system, the operation and maintenance (𝑀𝑡) expenditures and the 
fuel (𝐹𝑡) expenditures in the year t, in present values using discount rate (r). The 
electricity (𝐸𝑡) generated over the lifetime of the generation is also discounted. The 
levelized cost of electricity is a convenient measure to compare different generating 
technologies. The lower the levelized cost the more competitive the generating 
technology is. Electricity generation using renewable resources, such as solar or wind, 
has no fuel costs and small variable (𝑀𝑡) operation and maintenance expenditure. The 
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availability of financial incentives, including state or federal tax credits, can also 
impact the calculation of LCOE. The estimation of the LCOE is a projection, and there 
is uncertainty associated with the calculation. To estimate LCOE, we evaluate in 
present values a large number of future inputs and outputs based on a number of 
assumptions. This is the source of uncertainty. Also, the costs can vary regionally,  and 
across time, as technologies evolve and fuel prices change. The limitations of the 
LCOE method are well known and documented in the literature. A recent report from 
the U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2017) highlights that projected 
utilization rates, the existing resource mix, and capacity values are not taken under 
account in LCOE and a direct comparison of LCOE across technologies can be 
problematic. EIA proposes an additional assessment to determine the cost of 
electricity, the Levelized Avoided Cost of Electricity (LACE). EIA further suggests the 
evaluation of both measures to assess the economic competitiveness of various 
generation alternatives. However, LACE methodology is very complex and recent in 
literature. The added complexity, due to the absence of historical data, is the reason 
that LACE measures are not assessed in this section. Furthermore, it is not an 
objective of this research to compare the two methodologies that assess the cost of 
energy generated.  
LCOE is a comprehensive tool and commonly cited measurement used to evaluate and 
compare different technologies that generate electricity. The numbers reported for the 
LCOE used in this research have value as a trend. The levelized cost of electricity may 




3.3.1 The LCOE of renewable energy resources 
A presentation of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), for renewable energy 
resources, is used to develop an understanding about the cost gap between clean 
generation supply and energy conservation.  The supply cost of electricity from 
renewable resources continues to decline in US, as wind remains the most cost-
effective renewable technology. The utility-scale of solar photovoltaic (PV) 
technology demonstrates a higher rate of cost decrease.  
The wind LCOE decreased 66% in the period 2009-2016. The same period, utility-
scale solar LCOE decreased 85% (Lazard, 2016). 
 
Figure 8: Unsubsidized LCOE of wind and solar energy (2009-2016) 
Figure 8: Unsubsidized LCOE of wind and solar energy (2009-2016), demonstrates a 
clear picture of cost reduction for renewable resources. Even though renewable energy 
is increasingly cost-competitive, the cost has declined relatively modestly over the last 
five years for wind and rooftop solar. The LCOE decreases further with the inclusion 
of federal and state incentives. Table 4: LCOE - Renewable Resource (Lazard-2016) 
provides the range of the LCOE from renewable resources, based on the data provided 
from the investment bank, Lazard, in a study published in December 2016.  
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Wind onshore $32 $62 
Solar PV – Residential Rooftop $138 $222 
Solar PV – C&I Rooftop $88 $193 
Solar Utility Scale (thin film) $46 $56 
Solar Utility Scale (crystalline) $49 $61 
 
Table 4: LCOE - Renewable Resource (Lazard-2016)  
The prices provided are based on an 8% cost-of-capital and a facility life-circle that 
ranges from 20 to 30 years.  
In 2015, annual energy outlook, published by the EIA, provided LCOE for those 
plants going into service in the year 2020 (EIA, Annual Energy Outlook , 2016). 
Those projected prices are much higher than the LCOE provided by Lazard (2016). 






Wind $65.6 $73.6 $81.6 
Solar PV $97.8 $125.3 $193.3 
 
Table 5: LCOE - Renewable Resources (EIA-2015) 
Data provided by the Advanced Energy Economy Institute (AEEI), dispute the EIA 
reported LCOE. The AEEI data conclude that the average power purchase 
agreement (PPA) for wind power was already at $24/MWh in 2013, and for the utility-
scale solar PV, the price ranges from $50 to $75/MWh.  
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3.3.2 The LCOE of energy efficiency  
The most comprehensive estimates, for the total cost of saving electricity, were 
published in a report by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Hoffman, 2015). 
The report evaluates the electricity savings gained through energy efficiency programs 
that have been funded by ratepayers in 20 states. The report estimates that the U.S. 
average total cost of saved electricity, weighted by energy savings, was $0.046 per 
kWh for the period 2009 to 2013. The median value for programs, with claimed 
energy savings across all sectors, was $0.069 per kWh. The difference between the 
average and median reflects the fact that some programs delivered a large share of 
overall savings at a low total cost.  
In the report by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the total cost of saved 
energy is the total cost of the energy saved, spread in equal payments, over the 
economic life of the actions taken through a utility program, divided by the annual 
energy saved.  
LCOEE = 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟∗(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡)
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 (𝑘𝑊ℎ)
 
Where LCOEE is the levelized cost of energy efficiency. The capital recovery factor is 
𝐴∗(1+𝐴)𝐵
(1+𝐴)𝐵−1
 , where A is the discount rate, and B the estimated program lifetime in years. 
The study used a 6 percent real discount rate as an approximation of the weighted 
average cost of capital for an investor-owned electric utility. The evaluation used 





Chapter 4. Research Findings 
4.1. First Empirical Application - National level analysis  
From 2005 to 2015, utilities reported that EE programs saved 1.05% of the sample’s 
annual electricity consumption, on average.  During the same period, the EE programs 
had an average cost of $0.0396 per kWh, saved in nominal dollars, and an adjusted 
cost of $0.042 in 2015 dollars. In order to test the hypothesis of whether EE 
expenditures increased the energy efficiency of the US economy, we estimate the 
percent change in aggregate US electricity consumption due to aggregate expenditure 
on energy efficiency EE.  Based on the econometric modeling assessed from this 
research, the savings produced by utilities are estimated to be between 0.48% - 0.75% 
of the sample’s annual electricity consumption. The results imply a price elasticity of 
energy efficiency ranging between 0.29 - 0.54; indicating a rebound effect. This 
rebound effect implies that energy use is reduced less than proportionately to the 
increase in energy efficiency. It translates to an average cost of $0.051 - $0.06 per 
kWh saved, in nominal dollars, and an adjusted cost of $0.055 - $0.064 in 2015 
dollars. The key finding is that utilities have been overestimating electricity savings 
and underestimating costs associated with EE incentive programs. The existence of a 
rebound effect suggests that energy savings are less than proportional to the increase 
in energy efficiency. However, consumers also benefit from an increase in energy 
services, since they get more of the service, at less cost to them.  This claim is based 
on point estimates of average EE electricity savings and costs implied by an 
econometric model of electricity demand. 
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Electric utility companies have been implementing EE programs across the US for 
decades. During the past five years, we observe a strong positive trend in 
strengthening these programs by increasing their investments. EE programs’ 
expenditure reached a  high of $5.7 billion in 2015.  The market of EE investments is 
estimated to be between $41 (IEA, 2017)  and $63.7 (AEE, 2016) billion in revenue. 
Lighting is the largest segment and accounts for 39% of the total U.S. building 
efficiency revenue. The investments in HVAC equipment and in building envelop 
follow with 22% of the total revenues (AEE, 2016). A study in 2015, prepared by 
Booz Allen Hamilton for the U.S. Green Building Council, identifies that the green 
building sector supports over 2.3 million jobs and will directly contribute an additional 
1.1 million jobs by 2018 (Hamilton, 2015). 
The industry is growing rapidly. Furthermore, there is an almost universal belief that 
EE will not only reduce electricity consumption but will also decrease the 
environmental impacts of fossil fuels.  As a result, policymakers approach the energy 
efficiency market as a ‘win-win’; a success story that improves consumers’ wellbeing 
while boosting the economy with large investments and the creation of new jobs.    
The literature review section of this paper identified empirical evidence that EE 
programs promote cost-effective investments. The studies examined suggest that there 
is a strong statistically significant effect of EE programs on reducing electricity 
consumption. However, there is also an increasing concern that savings estimated by 
utilities are exceeding the actual performance of the programs. Moreover, the literature 
also highlights the rebound effect that can occur after the implementation of EE 
investments; when consumers realize decreasing electricity expenses, they tend to 
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increase their consumption. In addition, selection bias reduces the effectiveness of the 
programs, as EE incentives do not always target end-consumers on the margin of 
doing EE. Instead, EE programs provide incentives to all consumers, many of whom 
would implement the investment even without the additional benefits of the programs 
(‘free riders’). However, this transfer of funding to consumers that would have 
adopted the practices anyway has an ethical argument in favor. A transfer is not 
unwelcome since the program rewards those who adopt desirable actions, even if they 
didn’t require the reward to adopt the action. In the pollution “offset” literature, this is 
referred to as “additionality”— actions that would be taken “in addition to” those that 
would happen without the program. 
The argument is that the rebound effect and free-riders lead to the overestimation of 
the overall energy savings that result from program implementation. At the same time, 
it may be in the best interest of utilities to demonstrate higher-than-actual electricity 
savings, since EE programs are designed to compensate utilities based on the savings 
achieved by the programs. These factors can develop a gap between expected and 
realized savings from Energy Efficiency programs.   
This chapter provides results that are consistent with the reviewed literature.  The 
econometric model used in this paper suggests that EE expenditure does reduce 
electricity consumption. EE programs provide robust incentives to consumers and to 
businesses to overcome market barriers to the implementation of EE investments. 
Contemporary technological improvements and industrial automated production 
processes tend to reduce costs of new, improved and innovative efficient products. In 
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this economic landscape, EE incentives seem to accelerate and promote investments in 
energy efficiency.  
However, this analysis raises a concern about the magnitude of the effects of EE 
programs. This research indicates that observed savings are less than those reported by 
utilities,  which implies a cost of energy saved through EE is higher than that 
estimated by utilities, which has implications for cost-effectiveness of EE programs. 
This makes the creation of successful policy more complicated. Especially since 
policymakers and energy stakeholders generally believe that the industry needs 
additional incentives, particularly under the environmental threat of GHG emissions 
under the assumption that EE is the most cost-effective energy resource available 
(Yang & Yu, 2015).  
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4.1.1 Findings on reported electricity savings  
In the examined period, 2005 to 2015, utilities reported that EE programs saved 1.05% 
of the sample’s annual electricity consumption, on average.  During the same period, 
EE programs had an average cost of $0.0396 per kWh saved in nominal dollars and an 
adjusted cost of $0.042 in 2015 dollars.   
The number of electric utilities that participated in EE Programs for the same period is 
a subset of the total number of utilities. In 2005, 251 utilities that participated in EE 
programs reported incremental energy savings, from program implementation, that 
had an average annual cost of $5.01 million. Eleven years later in 2015, the number of 
electric utilities with active EE programs had doubled. It is worth mentioning that not 
only is there a significant increase in the number of electric utilities offering EE 
programs, but programs became more extensive. The average program cost increased 
from $5.1 to $9.76 million, a 95% increase. As a consequence, the total expenditure 
for EE programs for the year 2015 increased to $5.73 billion. This figure, when 
compared to the $1.26 billion that was spent in 2005, represents an increase of 355%, 
in nominal values. The total cost of program implementation can be divided into two 
categories: the financial incentives that are provided to end customers, and all other 
costs. Customer’s financial incentives can be in the form of cash payments, subsidized 
tariff rates relative to non-participants, in-kind services like design work, and any 
benefits directly provided to end customers for their participation in a program. Before 
2010, the “other costs” category was reported in terms of direct and indirect costs to 
the utility. Annually reported program expenditures by group of expense and by state 
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are presented in Table 7: Annual Costs of Electricity Efficiency Program 
Implementation.  
For the examined period, annual nation-wide electricity sales follow a flat trend.  
Utility annual sales, revenues, number of customers and number of utilities that were 
in business, are presented in Table 9: Annual Electricity Consumption in US.  
Electricity sales to residential, commercial and industrial customers are depicted in 
Table 10: Electricity consumption by Sector in US (MWh). Based on the data 
presented, there is a notable reduction in the industrial sector’s demand for electricity, 
from 27.79% in 2005 to 26.24% in 2015. During the same period, the residential 
sector’s share was stable and flat while the commercial sector’s share increased from 
34.89% in 2005 to 36.20% in 2015. The number of utilities that provided services in 
the examined period fell from 3,541 utilities in 2005 to 3,212 in 2015, a 9.3% 
decrease.   
The reported, incremental, annual, average electricity savings increased from 23,421 
MWh in 2005, to 44,615 MWh in 2015.  In addition, for the last three years of the 
period examined,  2013 to 2015, utilities started to report lifecycle electricity savings 
from implemented programs. The ratio of incremental to lifecycle savings provides 
information about the weighted average in years of savings achieved by a program’s 
portfolio. For the period 2013 to 2015, this ratio was 10.9 years. This means that, on 
average, the impact of program implementation will result in energy savings for a 
period of about 11 years from the date of intervention.  
The weighted average electricity savings (S) as a percent of electricity consumption 




∑  𝑁𝑛=1 ∑ (𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡 − 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 )
𝑇𝑛
𝑡=1




Which equals 1.05% of the associated electricity consumption. Program costs can be 
expressed as: 
(C) = 
∑  𝑁𝑛=1 ∑ 𝐶𝑛𝑡 
𝑇𝑛
𝑡=1




which is the weighted average cost per kWh saved (reported by utilities); $0.0396 in 
nominal dollars and a adjusted cost of $0.042 in 2015 dollars.  
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4.1.2 Findings on econometric modeling to derive electricity savings   
In order to test the hypothesis of whether EE expenditures increased the energy 
efficiency of the US economy, we estimate the percent change in aggregate US 
electricity consumption due to aggregate expenditure on EE. From 2005 to 2015, 
based on the econometric modeling presented in the methodology chapter, the savings 
produced by utilities are estimated to be between 0.48% - 0.75% of the sample’s 
annual electricity consumption. The results imply a price elasticity of energy 
efficiency in the range of 0.29 - 0.54. This is an indication of a rebound effect. Based 
on this estimation, the EE programs had an average cost of  $0.051 - $0.06 per kWh 
saved, in nominal dollars, and an adjusted cost of $0.0551 - $0.0648 in 2015 dollars.  
The performed analysis is based on models described in the methodology section. The 
essence of the concept is that while we can observe electricity consumption after the 
implementation of an EE program, we cannot observe what the demand for electricity 
would have been in the absence of the program. For this reason, we used econometric 
modeling to construct an estimate of electricity demand, as it would have been without 
the EE programs. For this purpose, four specifications are presented in Table 19: Effect 
of EE programs in Electricity Consumption, to better describe the relationship between 
electricity consumption - 𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑛𝑡- and expenditures for EE programs. The dependent 
variable is the logarithmically transformed electricity consumption, the difference of 
which -   
𝛥𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑛𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡- 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡−1  
represents a percent change in consumption.  
The regression specification is identified by equation (5) as:  
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𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡=𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽2+ 𝛸𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽3+ 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽3 +𝜇𝑖+𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (5) 
Where the dependent variable (𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡) is the logarithmic sales of electricity for utility 
(i), in state (j), in year (t).  𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the logarithmic EE program cost. The estimate of the 
coefficient 𝛽1 is an elasticity of energy consumption with respect to expenditures on the 
energy efficiency program. The interpretation of  𝛽1 is the effect of energy efficiency 
programs on electricity consumption and is the primary objective of this application. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 controls for the number of customers for utility i, in state j, in the year t. 𝛸𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a 
vector of utility level covariates and 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a vector of state level covariates. The 
𝜇𝑖, 𝜈𝑡 , 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡:are utility and year fixed effects and the potentially heteroskedastic error 
term. 
Taking first differences of equation (5) we estimate: 
𝛥𝑡𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗=   𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝛥𝑡 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝛽2+ 𝛥𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽3+ 𝛥𝑡 𝑍𝑗𝛽4+ 𝛥𝑡 ν + 𝛥𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (6) 
Where 𝛥𝑡 is the first difference of electricity consumption in period t and (t-1):  
𝛥𝑡𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗=𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 −  𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡−1    
The specification (5) includes year fixed effects to control for changes that are common 
to all utilities. The coefficient 𝛽1 𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 in equation (5), is a measure of the effect of 
EE program cost, at the utility level, on electricity consumption. The model 
specification controls for covariates that vary over time within states and utilities. At the 
utility level, time-varying variables include the number of customers that each utility 
services, and the sales share of Commercial and Industrial sectors. State time-varying 
covariates include the cost of electricity, weather conditions in terms of cooling and 
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heating degree days, gross state product, and the cost of natural gas and housing 
characteristics.  
 
The results of the econometric model are presented in Table 19: Effect of EE programs 
in Electricity Consumption. These results show that for the period 2005-2011 the EE 
expenditure is statistically significant, at better than 1% (p<0.01), with the expected 
negative sign. As utilities increase EE program costs, electricity consumption decreases. 
The coefficient for the number of customers and the degree days is positive and 
statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient for cooling degree days is 
higher than the one for heating degree days. This indicates a stronger relationship 
between electricity consumption and cooling needs. Electricity price has a negative sign 
in models 3 and 4 but is statistically significant at p<0.1 only in model 3. Model 4 




4.2 Second Empirical Application - State level analysis findings 
This section addresses the effectiveness of energy efficiency programs in reducing 
energy consumption, using data at the state level. In the examined period, 2005 to 
2015,  the second empirical application assessed the most aggressive, in terms of 
expenditure, EE program in US, the electricity EE program of Rhode Island. Two 
distinct methodologies, the DiD, and SCM compare Rhode Island’s residential 
electricity consumption per customer with a counterfactual estimate. Here, 
counterfactual means “what would have occurred without an aggressive EE program 
in place.” 
This section applies the difference in differences and synthetic control method to 
assess the effectiveness of energy efficiency programs in reducing energy use at the 
state level using observational data from states in New England. This methodology 
evaluates program performance between states with dynamic EE investment policies 
and states with moderate investments in EE programs.   
Findings from the comparative case study using the SCM, suggest that electricity sales 
in Rhode Island fell after the implementation of an aggressive EE program in 2008. 
However, the estimate of reduction is less than expected and reported by utilities. This 
difference is consistent with the findings of the first empirical application. The second 
methodology, using DiD, compared the performance of the residential electricity EE 
program of  RI with that of NH and ME. The study identified that there is not a 
statistically significant effect on residential consumption, as a result of the substantial 
increase in EE expenditure in RI during the period 2008 to 2015, relative to NH and 
ME, states with more moderate programs.   
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The main objectives of states’ energy policies are to provide a reliable, clean and low-
cost energy supply. Energy efficiency (EE) programs, funded by ratepayers, influence 
this objective by supporting the concept that the cheapest energy is the energy you 
don’t produce in the first place. This section examines the question of whether high-
intensity EE programs, as expressed with the adoption of aggressive spending,  
contribute to proportionately larger energy savings. The scenario being examined 
describes the situation where the cost of electric EE programs increases significantly - 
by a factor of 2 or higher, as an outcome of changes in policy. In this case, 
stakeholders expect the observed electricity consumption to follow a different trend, to 
decrease, in comparison to the pre-intervention period.  However, the outcome of the 
intervention may not result in a clear change in consumption. In this case, program 
administrators may assume that there is another effect in play; an increase in 
consumption was avoided. Under the second scenario, the absence of an observed 
counterfactual creates uncertainty in the identification of a program’s effectiveness. 
The goal of this chapter is to identify if a continuous increase in EE incentives will 




4.2.1 Difference in differences methodology 
In the examined period, 2005 - 2015,  the second empirical application assessed the 
energy efficiency policy of Rhode Island and compared its outcome to Maine and New 
Hampshire. Findings suggest that there is not a statistically significant effect in 
residential consumption as a result of the substantial increase in EE expenditure in RI 
during the period 2008 to 2015.  
Specifically, the DiD methodology was employed to identify if a legislative act known 
as Least Cost Procurement (LCP) that established new standards in energy efficiency 
investment decisions affected the residential electricity consumption in Rhode Island.   
Rhode Island’s least-cost procurement policy requires that energy demands be met in a 
manner that is cost-effective, reliable, prudent and environmentally responsible.  The 
same policy also permitted an increase in EE program expenditures from about 2% of 
total annual electricity revenues, to about 7% by the year 2013, making RI the state 
with the most aggressive EE program in the US.  
 
Figure 9: Cost of Electricity Efficiency Programs 
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Treatment is defined by the magnitude of the cost of the EE program spending as a 
percentage of total electricity sales revenues. Initially, utilities were grouped into 
discrete groups (D) based on their spending on EE programs. The lowest percent of 
expenditure for EE programs was chosen to serve as the control group. Then, instead 
of using the two-period model, effects are estimated in three periods. 1) pre-
implementation (PI), in which utilities have approximately the same level of EE 
program spending, 2) post-implementation first phase (PI1P), which is after the 
announcement of a substantial increase in the expenditure on EE programs. This is the 
phase with higher expected savings,  and 3) post-implementation second (PI2P); this is 
the phase of implementation with lower expected savings.  
The model described allows for two treatment periods, PI1P and PI2P, to have a 
differential impact on electricity intensity. PI1P, the intermediate period, may include 
low hanging fruit savings and behavioral impacts, while savings for the P12P period 
may include more comprehensive, deep savings that are less cost-effective.  The 
specification is: 
ln(𝑐𝑖) = ∑ 𝛼𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽1
𝐺
𝑘=2
𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐼2𝑃𝑖 
+ ∑ 𝛾1𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑘𝑖 𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖 +
𝐺
𝑘=2 ∑ 𝛾2𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑘𝑖 𝑃𝐼2𝑃𝑖 + 
𝐺
𝑘=2 𝑋𝑖′δ + 𝜀𝑖              (1) 
    
￼ is the electricity consumption in utility i𝑐𝑖￼𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑘𝑖, equal to one, if an EE 
program in utility i is within the ￼𝑘𝑡ℎ￼ 𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖  ￼𝑃𝐼2𝑃𝑖  , equal to one, if consumption 
occurs in period ￼𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖￼𝑃𝐼2𝑃𝑖  ￼𝑋𝑖 number of residential customers, price of 
electricity, state specific GDP, heat and cooling degree days, housing characteristics 
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and share of electricity in heating methods. ￼𝑋𝑖 control group in time period PI. 
Finally, ￼𝜀𝑖 
ents are interpreted as follows:￼ 𝛼𝑘￼𝛽1￼𝛽2￼𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖 ￼𝑃𝐼2𝑃𝑖￼𝛾1𝑘￼𝛾2𝑘, and 
measure, for ￼𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖￼ respectively, the differential change in residential electricity 
consumption from the pre-announcement time period for group k relative to the 
change in consumption of the control group. 
Table 20: Difference in differences estimate of the EE program spending, presents the 
causal inference estimates for the effect of EE programs on RI residential electricity 
consumption. There are four different columns that represent four different models. All 
four models utilize panel data over a period of 11 years, in three states (RI, ME and 
NH). The dependent variable is the logarithmic transformation of residential electricity 
consumption, reported from each utility ln(𝑐𝑖). 
The set of coefficients is described in Table 20: Difference in differences estimate of 
the EE program spending, under the section Difference-in-Differences corresponding 
to 𝛾1𝑘 and 𝛾2𝑘 in equation (1) represents the coefficients of interest. They measure the 
differential change in residential electricity consumption in two periods, T1 for period 
𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖  and  T2 for 𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖,  for RI utilities relative to the change in consumption of 
utilities in ME and NH in the period before the year 2008. The coefficients under the 
DT1 description correspond to 𝛾1𝑘 coefficients of equation (1) and describe the 
interaction terms between the treatment group (RI utilities) and the first treatment 
period, years 2008-2010.  All coefficients have a negative sign but are statistically 
insignificant. The same negative sign and statistical insignificance are seen on the 
coefficients corresponding to 𝛾2𝑘 for period T2, years 2011 to 2014.  
102 
 
Figure 10: Residential Electricity Consumption Index (ME, NH, RI),  provides an 
insight into the residential electricity consumption for a period larger than the already 
examined. The objective of the index is to provide, in a comparative framework, the 
trend of electricity consumption. Having as the base year, 2005, we observe how 
electricity consumption changes, annually, through year 2016. The treated unit, the 
state of RI,  and the control states followed similar trends, over the examined period. 
 
Figure 10: Residential Electricity Consumption Index (ME, NH, RI) 
The Figure 11: Residential Electricity Consumption kWh (ME, NH, RI) – represents 
the trend of the annual residential electricity consumption per consumer for the period 




Figure 11: Residential Electricity Consumption kWh (ME, NH, RI) 
 
 











2005 7.439 7.744 6.658 -0.305 0.781 
2006 7.036 7.486 6.348 -0.450 0.688 
2007 7.292 7.586 6.357 -0.295 0.935 
2008 7.074 7.395 6.258 -0.321 0.816 
2009 6.796 7.479 6.257 -0.683 0.539 
2010 7.240 7.508 6.249 -0.268 0.991 
2011 7.237 7.429 6.247 -0.192 0.989 
2012 7.168 7.378 6.367 -0.210 0.801 
2013 7.222 7.544 6.615 -0.322 0.607 
2014 6.996 7.432 6.593 -0.436 0.403 





























4.2.2 Synthetic control method (SCM) 
We apply the synthetic control method to study the effects of the Least Cost 
Procurement (LCP) legislation in RI. LCP required Rhode Island’s utilities to invest in 
cost-effective energy efficiency that is less expensive than supply. Large-scale 
investments in EE programs started, in RI, in 2008. Using the techniques described in 
Chapter 3, we construct a synthetic Rhode Island, with weights (W) chosen such that 
the constructed synthetic Rhode Island best represents the values of the predictors of 
electricity consumption for residential customers in Rhode Island in the pre-
implementation period. Subsequently, cross-validation technique was introduced to 




where 𝑢𝑚 is a weight that reflects the relative importance assigned to the m-th variable 
(X), when we measure the discrepancy between 𝑋1𝑚 − 𝑋0𝑚𝑊.   
Synthetic controls must closely reproduce the values that variables with large 
predictive power, on the outcome of interest, take for the unit affected by the 
intervention. Accordingly, those variables should be assigned large 𝑢𝑚 weights. In the 
empirical application below, we apply a cross-validation method to choose 𝑢𝑚. 
We use predictors measured in the pre-implementation to select the weights 𝑢𝑚, such 
that the constructed synthetic control minimizes the root mean square prediction error 
(RMSPE).  
 
Initially, SCM is applied to a single treated unit, the state of RI. Each synthetic version 
is constructed with weights from a pool of control states. Predictors include 
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demographic variables, income and lagged dependent outcomes.  Figure 12 displays 
annual per-residential-customer electricity consumption for Rhode Island, and its 
synthetic counterpart, from 2005-2015. Table 26 displays the weight of each control 
state in the synthetic Rhode Island. The weights reported in table 27, indicate that 
electricity consumption trends in RI, prior to the passage of LCP, are best reproduced 
by a combination of New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. The 
remaining states, in the donor pool, were assigned zero weights (W). The weights 
assigned to state donors, combined with the high balance on electricity consumption 
predictors (Table 28), created a synthetic Rhode Island that provides an estimate to the 
per customer electricity consumption that would have occurred, in the absence of the 
LCP legislation. The developed SCM provides a methodical approach to estimate this 
counterfactual; the state of RI after the year 2008.      
In 2008, residential electricity consumption decreased markedly, in RI, relative to a 
comparable synthetic control region. We estimate that, by the year 2015, annual per-
consumer residential electricity consumption in Rhode Island was 97 kWh lower, on 
average, than what it would have been in the absence of LCP. 
 
























This reduction accounts for 1.34% of the average annual per consumer residential 
consumption of the post-treatment period. Another important finding is that electricity 
savings are not increasing cumulatively. The observed annual consumption is lower 
than the counterfactual, but its magnitude doesn’t increase over time. This is an 
indication of an existing rebound effect. As the service of electricity decreases, 
consumers adjust their consumption to a higher level. 
4.2.2.1 Inference about the effect of the LCP in RI  To evaluate the statistical 
significance of our estimates, we pose the question of whether the results could be 
driven entirely by chance. How often would we obtain results of this magnitude if we 
had randomly chosen a state, for the study, instead of Rhode Island? To answer this 
question, we use placebo tests. We evaluate findings and results from a  treated unit. A 
placebo study evaluates northeast states with moderate expenditures in EE programs. 
If the treatment effect was not random, the effect should be more visible in the treated 
state.  


















































Figure 13: Residential electricity consumption – Placebo study 
Figure 13: Residential electricity consumption – Placebo study demonstrates the 
synthetic control method to study the effects of EE programs in the Northeast US with 
moderate incentive programs in EE, during the same period.  Moderate EE programs 
are defined, in this study, based on the reported savings as a percentage of the total 
residential consumption. Five states NH, CT, NJ, NY and PA reported less than half 
the percentage of electricity savings compared to RI’s EE program.   
Findings show that Connecticut and New Jersey have real-synthetic gaps; with their 
real consumption being lower than their synthetic. In contrast, Pennsylvania has the 
opposite effect of real-synthetic gaps. In New York and New Hampshire, the gaps are 
small and fluctuate in the post-intervention period.  
In conclusion, the state of RI’s post-intervention electricity consumption trajectory has 






































































between real vs. synthetic, is more visible in the treated state (RI) compared to NY, 
NH, and PA. However, CT and NJ both provide large intervention effects, even 







4.3 Cost Comparison - Energy efficiency and renewable energy generation 
Over the examined period, renewable energy generation declined significantly in the 
US. Wind remains the most cost-effective renewable technology, and the LCOE of 
wind supply is close to $0.05 per kWh. The utility-scale of solar photovoltaic 
technology demonstrates a higher rate of cost decrease with an average LCOE of 
$0.06 per kWh. These estimates for the LCOE of renewable resources are before any 
incentives.  
Using EE investments to decrease the demand of electricity, the claimed energy 
savings had a cost of $0.069 per kWh (Hoffman, 2015). This estimate is rather 
conservative based on the analysis of this research. However, the comparison of the 
levelized cost of energy vs. energy efficiency does not consider the environmental 
costs of energy supply.  Comparing this cost to the average cost of electricity, in the 
same period, $0.1043 per kWh - Table 12- suggests that the cost of implementing EE 
is considerably lower than the cost of electricity supply. This finding supports the 
continued increase of EE program development. However, this research finds that the 
levelized cost of EE is higher than believed. Although the increased cost is still rather 
low, compared to the average cost of consumed electricity, there is a question about 
the cost-effectiveness of EE in comparison to renewable energy generation. The 
levelized cost of renewable energy has dropped drastically over the past few years and 
continues to decrease. As this trend continues, renewable energy programs may 
challenge the cost-effectiveness of EE investments. Future empirical research is 
needed to address an important question: “what is the tipping point where the energy 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion, Discussion  
 
Energy efficiency programs provide well-documented benefits to end-users. Having a 
long history of implementation, the residential, commercial and industrial sectors 
utilize EE programs to replace inefficient legacy equipment, save energy and decrease 
operational costs. Since their introduction in the 1970’s, and throughout their history, 
EE programs have not always had the same objectives. Following the 1973 energy 
crisis, energy independence became the top priority of national energy policies and EE 
programs were implemented to serve this objective. Since then, many parameters have 
changed in the energy sector. The market economy dominates global trade, fossil fuel 
reserves are higher than previously believed, (Table 25: Proved Reserves of Fossil 
Fuels) and new technologies, especially from renewable resources, generate cost-
effective clean energy. At the same time, environmental concerns of the impact fossil 
fuel emissions have on climate change are at the center of every discussion regarding 
the future of energy generation. Although, as described, the economic environment has 
changed significantly, energy efficiency continues to play an important role in many 
states’ energy policies.   
In recent years, energy efficiency programs have protected end-users from the increase 
of energy costs. Utilities have developed customer-funded programs that provide 
financial incentives to ratepayers willing to invest in efficient equipment. These 
programs have become very popular. So much so, that spending for electricity-
reducing measures increased every year for the 11-year period examined in this study. 
The support for these programs is almost universal amongst stakeholders. Utilities,  
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state governments, and consumers alike, view efficiency programs positively. Utilities 
benefit twofold as EE programs benefit both their budgets and their profits.  As shown 
in the analysis, administrative and other costs (not incentives to customers) represent, 
on average, 45% of the total expenses for the examined period. Additionally, utilities 
get financial benefits when they achieve their energy-saving targets. State 
governments benefit too, as EE programs provide funding for state energy programs. 
Moreover, EE incentives are in-line with consumer’s increasingly environmentally 
conscious behavior. Consumers, especially residential, are supportive because EE’s 
popular rebates make the purchase of high-end, efficient equipment more affordable. 
Concerns that EE programs tend to benefit wealthier consumers, and increase the cost 
of electricity supply, are not prevalent.   
It is not in the scope of this study to question the benefits from energy efficiency 
improvements or examine who benefits most from EE programs. This study examines 
the effectiveness of these programs and their magnitude, as reported by utilities. The 
first empirical application, at the national level, provides evidence that the cost-
effectiveness of these programs is lower than utilities claim. The results imply a price 
elasticity of energy efficiency ranging between 0.29 and 0.54. These numbers indicate 
a rebound effect. Consequently, energy savings are less than proportional to the 
increase in energy efficiency. However, consumers also benefit from an increase in 
energy services, since they get more of the service, at less cost to them.   
This research makes the claim that energy consumption can be better explained by 
using the principles of economic behavior, as opposed to the reasoning-by-analogy 
approach. Economic agents, consumers, and businesses adjust their demand for energy 
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by increasing their consumption as the cost of energy drops. Doing so, increases their 
utility. This behavior is not taken into account by the engineering reports utilities 
produce. Utilities evaluate energy savings using the reasoning-by-analogy approach; 
estimating an equipment’s efficiency and then scaling up the benefits to society. 
However, this analogical reasoning is based on the assumption that the price elasticity 
of demand is very small (or even zero) for all consumers, which is a very strong 
assumption. As the cost for the service provided from energy usage decreases, the 
consumption of the service will increase by the commodity’s elasticity. As a result, the 
rebound effect will partially offset increases in energy efficiency. So, reductions in 
demand decrease are less than in proportion to increase in energy efficiency.  
However, it is important to recognize that there are significant welfare implications 
from such behavior. Consumers benefit from receiving more of the service. Further 
research is needed to quantify the exact welfare implications, but it can be assumed 
that utility increases when one can use more electricity. A good example of this, are 
the EE investments in highway lighting that have decreased energy and maintenance 
costs. Due to the reduction in costs of lighting highways, the RIDOT chose to 
significantly increase the hours highway lights are on. In this case, use of electricity 
was reduced less than in proportion to the increase in energy efficiency.  Ultimately, 
less electricity was used, and citizens also benefit from safer highway conditions, due 
to increased highway lighting.   
The state-level empirical application provided an insight into expectations from 
aggressive EE programs. For a number of years, Rhode Island has been the state with 
the highest per capita expenditure for EE programs, in the nation. Following a 
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comparative analysis, there are indications that Rhode Island does indeed realize 
savings but those savings are lower than expected.    
In the examined period, 2005 - 2015, the state-level empirical application assessed the 
energy efficiency policy of Rhode Island and compared its outcome to Maine and New 
Hampshire. Findings of the difference in differences analysis provide evidence that the 
higher savings observed in RI, compared to the control states of NH and ME, are not 
statistically significant. However, a re-evaluation of the Rhode Island EE policy, using 
the synthetic control method identifies that by the year 2015, annual per-consumer 
residential electricity consumption in Rhode Island was 97 kWh (1.34%) lower, on 
average, than it would have been in the absence of this policy.      
There are numerous reasons for this. The cost per energy unit saved is a result of many 
parameters; from how a state’s program is developed to how effectively a program is 
implemented. States with a long history in EE, like New York and California, have 
decreased their rate of spending on such programs, in recent years. Both these states 
have increased their efforts in other areas such as adoption of higher standards for 
appliances and equipment, adopting building codes that make homes more efficient, 
and emphasizing improvements in transportation. Moving forward it is  
important for states to reevaluate the priorities of their EE programs. Financial 
incentives have limitations and the cost of EE, per energy unit saved (kWh), is already 
at the same level as the levelized cost of renewable energy generation. Of course, it is 
important to keep in mind that renewable energy has negative externalities as well. 
Renewable energy impacts wildlife (especially birds), and has noise and visual 
115 
 
impacts, that are not embodied in the LCOE. In comparison, EE has mostly positive 
externalities. This is an important environmental advantage of the EE energy policies.   
As consumers increase their investments in renewable energy, they become more 
sensitive to energy issues, in general. Investments in renewable energy may lead to 
larger changes in demand patterns than the investments in EE programs have been 
able to accomplish. Further research is needed to examine how investments in 
renewable energy affect energy efficiency.   
There is no doubt that incentive programs in energy efficiency have merits, both 
conceptually and practically. However, there are likely to be diminishing returns to 
investments in energy efficiency.  Further study is needed to find the proper balance 





Figures and Tables 
Table 7: Annual Costs of Electricity Efficiency Program Implementation  
Year 










2005 $1,258,894 $634,867 50% $624,027 50% 
2006 $1,348,756 $650,607 48% $698,148 52% 
2007 $1,787,603 $845,536 47% $942,067 53% 
2008 $2,470,412 $1,079,891 44% $1,390,521 56% 
2009 $2,528,808 $1,133,910 45% $1,394,898 55% 
2010 $3,097,294 $1,614,853 52% $1,482,441 48% 
2011 $4,254,096 $2,369,344 56% $1,884,752 44% 
2012 $4,644,657 $2,454,144 53% $2,190,513 47% 
2013 $4,819,062 $2,872,906 60% $1,946,156 40% 
2014 $5,620,182 $3,411,034 61% $2,209,148 39% 
2015 $5,730,573 $3,449,385 60% $2,281,188 40% 
      
Total $37,560,337 $20,516,477 55% $17,043,859 45% 
 
 
(*) Energy Efficiency (EE) Customer incentives are the total financial value provided to a customer for 
program participation: cash payments, or lowered tariff rates relative to non-participants, in-kind 
services (e.g., design services), or other benefits directly provided to the customer for their program 
participation. 
 
(**) Other costs: Includes direct and indirect costs for the utility. Direct Costs, excluding incentive 
payments: The cost for implementing energy efficiency programs (in thousand dollars) incurred by the 
utility.  Indirect Cost: A utility cost that may not be meaningfully identified with any particular EE 
program category.  Indirect costs could be attributable to one of several accounting cost categories (i.e., 








Energy savings (*) 
(MWh)  
Program Total Cost 
$( ,000) 
2005 5,878,693 1,258,894 
2006 5,393,631 1,348,756 
2007 7,679,812 1,787,603 
2008 10,433,487 2,470,412 
2009 12,906,637 2,528,808 
2010 13,518,154 3,097,294 
2011 21,421,322 4,254,096 
2012 21,478,470 4,644,657 
2013 24,681,728 4,819,062 
2014 26,465,220 5,620,182 
2015 26,189,500 5,730,573 
 
Note: Incremental annual savings summarize the expected effect in demand in terms of MWh 
for each utility caused by new participants in existing programs and all participants in new 





Table 9: Annual Electricity Consumption in US 
Year Sales (*) Revenues (*) Customers Utilities 
2005 3,684,351,232 $           301,982,208 139,922,272 3,541 
2006 3,693,140,992 $           330,727,680 141,966,848 3,554 
2007 3,787,363,072 $           348,160,512 143,681,184 3,565 
2008 3,733,964,544 $           363,583,104 143,395,760 3,635 
2009 3,596,795,136 $           353,289,248 143,529,312 3,675 
2010 3,754,841,344 $           368,918,144 144,140,256 3,683 
2011 3,749,846,272 $           371,049,088 144,509,152 3,745 
2012 3,694,649,856 $           363,687,488 145,293,840 2,776 
2013 3,724,867,840 $           375,057,728 146,288,576 2,800 
2014 3,764,700,160 $           393,096,416 147,373,696 3,038 
2015 3,758,992,384 $           391,341,472 148,633,024 3,212 
 
Note: (*) Sales are reported in MWh and revenues in $(, 000). Includes residential, commercial, 
industrial and transportation sector. Numbers represent all utilities in US - included utilities that didn’t 









Table 10: Electricity consumption by Sector in US (MWh) 
Year Residential Commercial Industrial Transportation 
2005 
            
1,367,509,248            1,285,521,664  1,023,814,080              7,506,321  
2006 
            
1,359,551,360            1,310,322,560  1,015,909,568              7,357,543  
2007 
            
1,400,106,112            1,346,912,000  1,032,172,352              8,172,595  
2008 
            
1,380,661,760            1,336,133,504  1,009,516,160              7,653,211  
2009 
            
1,364,758,144            1,306,852,480  917,416,448              7,767,989  
2010 
            
1,445,708,416            1,330,199,424  971,221,184              7,712,412  
2011 
            
1,422,801,152            1,328,057,472  991,315,584              7,672,084  
2012 
            
1,374,514,688            1,327,101,184  985,713,856              7,320,028  
2013 
            
1,394,812,160            1,337,078,784  985,351,872              7,625,041  
2014 
            
1,407,208,320            1,352,158,208  997,576,128              7,757,555  
2015 
            
1,404,096,512            1,360,751,488  986,507,712              7,636,632  
 
 
Note: (*) Electricity consumption is reported in MWh. Numbers represent all utilities in US - included 





Table 11: Share of Electricity Demand by Sector 
 
Year Residential Commercial Industrial Transportation 
2005 37.12% 34.89% 27.79% 0.20% 
2006 36.81% 35.48% 27.51% 0.20% 
2007 36.97% 35.56% 27.25% 0.22% 
2008 36.98% 35.78% 27.04% 0.20% 
2009 37.94% 36.33% 25.51% 0.22% 
2010 38.50% 35.43% 25.87% 0.21% 
2011 37.94% 35.42% 26.44% 0.20% 
2012 37.20% 35.92% 26.68% 0.20% 
2013 37.45% 35.90% 26.45% 0.20% 
2014 37.38% 35.92% 26.50% 0.21% 
2015 37.35% 36.20% 26.24% 0.20% 
     
Note: (*) Shares of electricity demand represents all utilities (US) - included utilities that didn’t 




Table 12: Average Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers - Total by End-Use 
Sector, 2005 - 2015 (Cents per Kilowatt-hour)  
Period Residential Commercial Industrial Transportation 
All 
Sectors CPI  Adjusted 
 Average (base:2015) 
2005 9.45 8.67 5.73 8.57 8.14 195.3 9.88 
2006 10.40 9.46 6.16 9.54 8.90 201.6 10.46 
2007 10.65 9.65 6.39 9.70 9.13 207.3 10.44 
2008 11.26 10.26 6.96 10.71 9.74 215.3 10.72 
2009 11.51 10.16 6.83 10.66 9.82 214.5 10.85 
2010 11.54 10.19 6.77 10.56 9.83 218.1 10.68 
2011 11.72 10.24 6.82 10.46 9.90 224.9 10.43 
2012 11.88 10.09 6.67 10.21 9.84 229.6 10.16 
2013 12.13 10.26 6.89 10.55 10.07 233 10.24 
2014 12.52 10.74 7.10 10.45 10.44 236.7 10.45 
2015 12.65 10.64 6.91 10.09 10.41 237 10.41 
  average 10.43 
Note: Geographic coverage is the 50 States and the District of Columbia. 
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-826, Monthly Electric Sales and 
Revenue Report with State Distributions Report; Form EIA-861, Annual Electric Power 




Table 13: Cooling and Heating Degree Days (CDD-HDD) in Contiguous US 
Year CDD HDD Observations 
2005 
              
55,804  
            
249,316  576 
2006 
              
54,149  
            
232,922  576 
2007 
              
56,846  
            
247,366  576 
2008 
              
49,304  
            
262,532  576 
2009 
              
46,509  
            
261,481  576 
2010 
              
59,385  
            
255,095  576 
2011 
              
57,873  
            
251,566  576 
2012 
              
60,116  
            
220,438  576 
2013 
              
50,688  
            
262,792  576 
2014 
              
48,634  
            
266,883  576 
2015 
              
56,618  
            
239,392  576 
 
HDD and CDD are defined to a base temperature of 65° F which is adequate for human comfort.  The 
degree days are the number of degrees of Fahrenheit that mean outside air temperature deviates from 
the base (65° F) temperature. 




Table 14: Mean Annual Heating Degree Days by State (2005-2015)  
  State  HDD      State HDD 
1 North Dakota   9,146  
 
25 Oregon   5,298  
2 Montana   8,463  
 
26 New Jersey   5,146  
3 Minnesota   8,458  
 
27 West Virginia   5,089  
4 Wyoming   8,185  
 
28 Missouri   4,975  
5 Vermont   7,904  
 
29 Kansas   4,831  
6 Maine   7,735  
 
30 Maryland   4,578  
7 South Dakota   7,573  
 
31 Delaware   4,493  
8 Wisconsin   7,483  
 
32 New Mexico   4,477  
9 New Hampshire   7,434  
 
33 Kentucky   4,421  
10 Colorado   7,043  
 
34 Virginia   4,268  
11 Utah   7,003  
 
35 Tennessee   3,786  
12 Idaho   6,893  
 
36 Oklahoma   3,543  
13 Iowa   6,785  
 
37 Nevada   3,469  
14 Michigan   6,726  
 
38 North Carolina   3,392  
15 Nebraska   6,232  
 
39 Arkansas   3,386  
16 Massachusetts   6,133  
 
40 Georgia   2,837  
17 Illinois   6,089  
 
41 California   2,811  
18 New York   6,005  
 
42 Alabama   2,718  
19 Connecticut   5,867  
 
43 South Carolina   2,631  
20 Rhode Island   5,764  
 
44 Mississippi   2,443  
21 Ohio   5,720  
 
45 Arizona   1,950  
22 Pennsylvania   5,713  
 
46 Texas   1,845  
23 Washington   5,664  
 
47 Louisiana   1,709  
24 Indiana   5,646    48 Florida      681  
 
Note: The degree days are the number of degrees of Fahrenheit that mean outside air temperature 
deviates from the base (65° F) temperature.  The higher the amount of heating degree days is, the higher 
the amount of energy is needed to heat a building. 
 
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
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Table 15: Mean Annual Cooling Degree Days by State (2005-2015) 
  State  CDD      State CDD 
1 Florida   3,541  
 
25  New Jersey       873  
2 Arizona   3,077  
 
26  Iowa       818  
3 Texas   2,839  
 
27  West Virginia       791  
4 Louisiana   2,700  
 
28  Ohio       780  
5 Nevada   2,204  
 
29  South Dakota       717  
6 Mississippi   2,189  
 
30  Pennsylvania       700  
7 Oklahoma   1,964  
 
31  New York       618  
8 Alabama   1,954  
 
32  Connecticut       600  
9 South Carolina   1,944  
 
33  Michigan       577  
10 Arkansas   1,809  
 
34  Rhode Island       563  
11 Georgia   1,736  
 
35  Utah       547  
12 Kansas   1,507  
 
36  Wisconsin       521  
13 North Carolina   1,466  
 
37  Massachusetts       515  
14 Tennessee   1,425  
 
38  Idaho       514  
15 Missouri   1,283  
 
39  Minnesota       475  
16 Kentucky   1,228  
 
40  North Dakota       455  
17 Delaware   1,157  
 
41  Colorado       355  
18 Maryland   1,143  
 
42  Wyoming       303  
19 Virginia   1,125  
 
43  New Hampshire       299  
20 Nebraska   1,025  
 
44  Oregon       235  
21 New Mexico   1,020  
 
45  Vermont       235  
22 California      939  
 
46  Maine       233  
23 Indiana      910  
 
47  Montana       222  
24 Illinois      892    48  Washington       187  
 
Note: The degree days are the number of degrees of Fahrenheit that mean outside air temperature 
deviates from the base (65° F) temperature.  The higher the amount of cooling degree days is, the higher 
the amount of energy is needed to cool a building. 
 
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
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Table 16: Residential Annual Electricity Consumption by State (2014) 
 
Per Capita Sales (MWh) Counts Per Customer Ratio
Alaska 2,773        2,043,614          281,438          7,261                2.62
Alabama 6,795        32,929,598       2,169,790      15,176              2.23
Arkansas 6,215        18,441,120       1,345,009      13,711              2.21
Arizona 4,807        32,346,080       2,661,694      12,152              2.53
California 2,304        89,360,680       13,256,068    6,741                2.93
Colorado 3,378        18,092,932       2,193,520      8,248                2.44
Connecticut 3,554        12,777,579       1,459,239      8,756                2.46
Delaware 4,963        4,644,841          407,508          11,398              2.30
Florida 5,854        116,535,264     8,891,020      13,107              2.24
Georgia 5,662        57,167,388       4,137,057      13,818              2.44
Hawaii 1,820        2,583,770          425,168          6,077                3.34
Iowa 4,640        14,426,582       1,348,641      10,697              2.31
Idaho 4,976        8,134,913          690,277          11,785              2.37
Illinois 3,572        46,009,456       5,145,022      8,943                2.50
Indiana 5,108        33,703,964       2,784,660      12,103              2.37
Kansas 4,714        13,684,952       1,228,858      11,136              2.36
Kentucky 6,209        27,399,768       1,939,489      14,127              2.28
Louisiana 6,754        31,400,684       2,026,223      15,497              2.29
Massachusetts 2,971        20,071,160       2,720,128      7,379                2.48
Maryland 4,601        27,487,632       2,234,962      12,299              2.67
Maine 3,505        4,660,605          706,952          6,593                1.88
Michigan 3,380        33,514,992       4,273,126      7,843                2.32
Minnesota 4,176        22,791,466       2,345,860      9,716                2.33
Missouri 5,903        35,792,644       2,724,541      13,137              2.23
Mississippi 6,322        18,922,096       1,263,583      14,975              2.37
Montana 4,857        4,969,243          485,041          10,245              2.11
North Carolina 5,900        58,649,992       4,303,476      13,629              2.31
North Dakota 7,241        5,357,514          360,171          14,875              2.05
Nebraska 5,326        10,028,238       817,425          12,268              2.30
New Hampshire 3,396        4,510,487          606,883          7,432                2.19
New Jersey 3,120        27,892,582       3,470,874      8,036                2.58
New Mexico 3,170        6,611,970          869,875          7,601                2.40
Nevada 4,199        11,916,521       1,110,535      10,730              2.56
New York 2,531        49,974,912       7,046,829      7,092                2.80
Ohio 4,553        52,804,336       4,882,159      10,816              2.38
Oklahoma 6,018        23,351,144       1,710,352      13,653              2.27
Oregon 4,688        18,617,612       1,669,124      11,154              2.38
Pennsylvania 4,236        54,195,336       5,289,211      10,246              2.42
Rhode Island 2,910        3,070,347          438,879          6,996                2.40
South Carolina 6,361        30,715,986       2,157,091      14,240              2.24
South Dakota 5,659        4,827,368          384,749          12,547              2.22
Tennessee 6,496        42,538,248       2,756,932      15,430              2.38
Texas 5,223        140,899,744     10,138,874    13,897              2.66
United States 4,413        1,407,208,312 128,680,416 10,936              2.48
Utah 3,045        8,963,971          1,000,416      8,960                2.94
Virginia 5,577        46,443,716       3,303,676      14,058              2.52
Vermont 3,383        2,121,347          310,932          6,823                2.02
Washington 4,967        35,082,960       2,907,705      12,066              2.43
Wisconsin 3,807        21,925,712       2,631,430      8,332                2.19
West Virginia 6,485        11,990,728       862,869          13,896              2.14
Wyoming 4,712        2,752,313          265,720          10,358              2.20
Note: Ratio=consumption per customer (meter) / consumption per capita
Highlighted cells indicate the 5 lowest values in each column.




Table 17: Annual Per Capita Electricity Consumption 
 
  
1990 2000 2010 2015 Delta I Delta II
Alaska 3,004 2,954 2,931 2,773 (230)    (158)     
Alabama 5,116 6,459 7,425 6,795 1,679  (630)     
Arkansas 4,479 5,551 6,581 6,215 1,736  (366)     
Arizona 4,174 4,814 5,064 4,807 633     (257)     
California 2,222 2,331 2,337 2,304 81        (34)       
Colorado 2,959 3,242 3,586 3,378 419     (208)     
Connecticut 3,152 3,413 3,649 3,554 402     (95)       
District of Columbia 2,446 2,839 3,509 3,139 693     (370)     
Delaware 3,957 4,548 5,289 4,963 1,006  (326)     
Florida 5,457 6,169 6,485 5,854 398     (631)     
Georgia 4,596 5,416 6,337 5,662 1,066  (675)     
Hawaii 2,088 2,278 2,191 1,820 (268)    (372)     
Iowa 3,780 4,107 4,771 4,640 860     (130)     
Idaho 5,559 5,393 5,180 4,976 (584)    (204)     
Illinois 2,870 3,229 3,783 3,572 701     (212)     
Indiana 3,978 4,703 5,401 5,108 1,130  (293)     
Kansas 3,835 4,650 5,014 4,714 879     (300)     
Kentucky 4,552 5,773 6,701 6,209 1,657  (492)     
Louisiana 5,077 6,198 7,190 6,754 1,678  (436)     
Massachusetts 2,587 2,761 3,261 2,971 384     (290)     
Maryland 3,980 4,509 4,999 4,601 621     (398)     
Maine 3,192 2,926 3,292 3,505 313     212      
Michigan 2,719 3,086 3,511 3,380 661     (131)     
Minnesota 3,385 3,776 4,230 4,176 792     (53)       
Missouri 4,221 5,276 6,221 5,903 1,681  (319)     
Mississippi 4,756 6,037 6,793 6,322 1,566  (471)     
Montana 4,198 4,323 4,786 4,857 660     71         
North Carolina 4,974 5,758 6,503 5,900 927     (602)     
North Dakota 4,630 5,280 6,508 7,241 2,610  732      
Nebraska 4,298 4,869 5,523 5,326 1,027  (197)     
New Hampshire 3,097 2,948 3,405 3,396 299     (9)          
New Jersey 2,640 2,912 3,442 3,120 480     (322)     
New Mexico 2,343 2,711 3,270 3,170 827     (100)     
Nevada 4,537 4,659 4,297 4,199 (338)    (98)       
New York 2,141 2,264 2,626 2,531 390     (95)       
Ohio 3,488 4,091 4,720 4,553 1,066  (167)     
Oklahoma 5,423 5,686 6,300 6,018 595     (282)     
Oregon 5,378 5,310 4,909 4,688 (689)    (220)     
Pennsylvania 3,206 3,664 4,347 4,236 1,030  (111)     
Rhode Island 2,362 2,537 2,961 2,910 548     (51)       
South Carolina 5,215 6,280 7,086 6,361 1,146  (726)     
South Dakota 4,112 4,528 5,672 5,659 1,547  (13)       
Tennessee 5,876 6,420 7,109 6,496 620     (613)     
Texas 4,840 5,581 5,433 5,223 383     (211)     
United States 3,702 4,226 4,673 4,413 711     (261)     
Utah 2,453 2,902 3,183 3,045 592     (139)     
Virginia 4,525 5,283 6,035 5,577 1,052  (458)     
Vermont 3,202 3,339 3,399 3,383 181     (17)       
Washington 5,876 5,589 5,177 4,967 (909)    (210)     
Wisconsin 3,340 3,708 3,919 3,807 467     (112)     
West Virginia 4,226 5,389 6,711 6,485 2,259  (226)     
Wyoming 3,789 4,257 4,827 4,712 924     (114)     
Note: Highlighted cells indicate the 5 lowest values in each column.
Delta I column: Difference between years (2015)-(1990)
Delta II column: Difference between years (2015)-(2000)




Table 18: Total Energy Consumed per Capita, 2015 (million Btu)  
Rank State Total Energy  Rank State Total Energy 
1 LA 912  26 ME 305 
2 WY 893  27 PA 303 
3 AK 840  28 MO 301 
4 ND 803  29 DE 294 
5 IA 479  30 VA 283 
6 TX 470  31 GA 280 
7 NE 450  32 MI 279 
8 SD 447  33 WA 278 
9 IN 430  34 CO 272 
10 WV 421  35 DC 267 
11 OK 417  36 UT 264 
12 AL 393  37 NJ 256 
13 KY 390  38 NC 251 
14 MS 379  39 OR 238 
14 MT 379  40 MD 233 
16 KS 372  41 NH 229 
17 AR 354  42 NV 225 
18 SC 337  43 MA 213 
19 TN 329  44 VT 211 
20 NM 325  44 AZ 211 
21 MN 323  46 FL 210 
22 OH 322  46 CT 210 
23 ID 317  48 HI 198 
24 WI 308  49 CA 197 
25 IL 307  50 RI 192 
    51 NY 189 
       






Table 19: Effect of EE programs in Electricity Consumption 
Dependent Variable: First Difference (Δ) of Electricity Consumption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
     
EE Investments -0.00778*** -0.00627*** -0.00576*** -0.00509** 
 (0.00263) (0.00227) (0.00221) (0.00214) 
Customers 0.682*** 0.866*** 0.852*** 0.824*** 
 (0.149) (0.127) (0.119) (0.118) 
CDD 0.000104*** 0.000101*** 0.000133*** 0.000123*** 
 (1.82e-05) (1.55e-05) (3.23e-05) (3.52e-05) 
HDD 2.69e-05*** 2.15e-05*** 4.25e-05*** 4.20e-05*** 
 (3.04e-06) (4.21e-06) (1.09e-05) (1.07e-05) 
lnNGEID  0.0243* 0.0121 0.0273 
  (0.0127) (0.0101) (0.0221) 
lnGDPRV  -0.109** -0.190*** 0.166 
  (0.0511) (0.0629) (0.152) 
lnESRCD  0.110 -0.237* -0.137 
  (0.0714) (0.141) (0.144) 
SHRCOM   3.067** 2.881** 
   (1.357) (1.406) 
SHRIND   2.790** 2.668* 
   (1.370) (1.421) 
ESACDdata   -0.000472 -0.000368 
   (0.00114) (0.00116) 
ESCCDdata   0.00409 0.00759 
   (0.00516) (0.00616) 
ESICDdata   0.00878** 0.00463 
   (0.00375) (0.00431) 
Constant 6.315*** 5.393*** 5.492*** 1.049 
 (1.536) (1.231) (1.231) (1.818) 
     
R-squared 0.325 0.410 0.440 0.447 
Number of 
unique_id 
734 734 734 734 
     
Year FE No No No Yes 
Est. cost/kWh $0.050 $0.056 $0.058 $0.061 
Adjusted $0.053 $0.060 $0.062 $0.065 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20: Difference in differences estimate of the EE program spending 
Residential electricity consumption (period 2005-2015). 
 
Dependent variable: Residential electricity consumption (ln) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Random Effect Population 
Averaged Model 
Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
     
Utilities (relative to NH - ME)   
RI -0.222 -0.217   
 (0.216) (0.187)   
Time period (relative to Post Implementation)   
T1 -0.084 -0.061 -0.103 0.328 
 (0.109) (0.104) (0.188) (0.452) 
T2 -0.081 -0.051 -0.100 -0.159 
 (0.108) (0.115) (0.172) (0.521) 
Difference-in-differences   
RI-T1 -0.028 0.020 -0.057 -0.026 
 (0.067) (0.052) (0.095) (0.137) 
RI-T2 0.051 0.049 0.042 0.104 
 (0.089) (0.109) (0.116) (0.189) 
Consumers (n) 1.060*** 1.045*** 1.080*** 1.079*** 
 (0.037) (0.0281) (0.0618) (0.0581) 
CDD -0.000855* -0.000975* -0.000783* -0.00105 
 (0.000491) (0.000525) (0.000462) (0.00106) 
HDD -0.000176 -0.000174 -0.000182* 0.000208 
 (0.000109) (0.000113) (0.000109) (0.000321) 
Electricity cost  -0.602 -0.886 -0.465 -0.845 
 (0.545) (0.556) (0.776) (1.294) 
Income 0.412 0.805 -0.191 0.181 
 (0.724) (0.594) (3.401) (5.122) 
Occupancy 28.96* 33.10* 27.61 38.63 
 (16.33) (17.05) (19.33) (34.03) 
     
Constant 3.559 3.258 5.156 2.358 
 (3.038) (3.006) (10.79) (18.41) 
Observations 326 326 326 326 
R-squared   0.867 0.871 
Number of 
Utilities 
71 71 71 71 
Utility FE   YES YES 
Year FE    YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Figure 15: Cooling Degree Days in the Northeastern United States  
 
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
Note: Abbreviations used in the graph: Connecticut (CT) - Massachusetts (MA) - Maine (ME) –New 
Hampshire (NH) – New Jersey (NJ) – New York (NY)-  Rhode Island (RI) – Pennsylvania (PA) - 




Figure 16: Heating Degree Days in the Northeastern United States 
 
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  
Note: Abbreviations used in the graph: Connecticut (CT) - Massachusetts (MA) - Maine (ME) –New 
Hampshire (NH) – New Jersey (NJ) – New York (NY) -  Rhode Island (RI) – Pennsylvania (PA) - 





Figure 17: Degree Days – US Map (2015) 
 










Figure 19: Residential Electricity Consumption Index in US 
 
 
Note: Index for the Residential Electricity Consumption was produced by normalizing annual 
consumption to the consumption of base year 2005.  
Source: Author by utilizing time series data reported by the EIA  
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Table 21: Energy Efficiency Variables Reported by Year (EIA-861) 
    2005 20066 20077 2008 2009 20100 20111 20122 2013 2014 2015 
 Utility id yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 Utility name yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(1) EE Incremental 
Res 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 EE Incremental 
Com 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 EE Incremental 
Ind 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 EE Incremental 
Tran 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 EE Incremental 
Total 
(*) (*) (*) (*) (*) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(2) EE Annual Res yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no 
 EE Annual Com yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no 
 EE Annual Ind yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no 
 EE Annual Tran yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no 
 EE Annual Total (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) yes yes yes no no no 
(3) EE_lc_res - - - - - - - - yes yes yes 
 EE_lc_com - - - - - - - - yes yes yes 
 EE_lc_ind - - - - - - - - yes yes yes 
 EE_lc_tran - - - - - - - - yes yes yes 
 EE_lc_tot - - - - - - - - yes yes yes 
(4) DirectCostEE_Res - - - - - yes yes yes yes* yes* yes* 
 DirectCostEE_Com - - - - - yes yes yes yes* yes* yes* 
  DirectCostEE_Ind - - - - - yes yes yes yes* yes* yes* 
  DirectCostEE_Tran - - - - - yes yes yes yes* yes* yes* 
  DirectCostEE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes* yes* yes* 
(5) IncentiveEE_Res - - - - - yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 IncentiveEE_Com - - - - - yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 IncentiveEE_Ind - - - - - yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 IncentiveEE_Tran - - - - - yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  IncentiveEE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(6) DirectCost_lmres - - - - - yes yes yes no no no 
 DirectCostl_mcom - - - - - yes yes yes no no no 
 DirectCost_lmind - - - - - yes yes yes no no no 
 DirectCost_lmtran - - - - - yes yes yes no no no 
 DirectCost_lm yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no 
(7) Incentive_lmres - - - - - yes yes yes no no no 
 Incentive_lmcom - - - - - yes Yes yes no no no 
 Incentive_lmind - - - - - yes yes yes no no no 
 Incentive_lmtran - - - - - yes yes yes no no no 
 Incentive_lm yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no 
(8) IndirectCost_Res - - - - - yes yes yes yes* yes* yes* 
 IndirectCost_Com - - - - - yes yes yes yes* yes* yes* 
 IndirectCost_Ind - - - - - yes yes yes yes* yes* yes* 
 IndirectCost_Tran - - - - - yes yes yes yes* yes* yes* 
  IndirectCost yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes* yes* yes* 
 TotalCost_Res - - - - - yes yes yes yes** yes** yes** 
 TotalCost_Com - - - - - yes yes yes yes** yes** yes** 
 TotalCost_Ind - - - - - yes yes yes yes** yes** yes** 
 TotalCost_Tran - - - - - yes yes yes yes** yes** yes** 
 TotalCost yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes** yes** yes** 
Notes             
(1) Efficiency Incremental Effect for residential, commercial, industrial and transportation  
(2)  Energy Efficiency Annual Effect for residential, commercial, industrial, transportation   
(3) Life cycle efficiency savings (4) Direct efficiency cost by sector (5) Incentives efficiency   
(6) Direct cost load management (7) Incentives load management (8) Indirect cost by sector  
(*) yes: Direct and indirect efficiency cost are reported together as 'other'.     
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Table 22: Building Efficiency Revenue in US (million $) 
Segment 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Design Services $3,128 $3,351 $3,850 $4,336 
Building Envelope $9,645 $11,919 $12,766 $14,127 
HVAC $11,532 $12,306 $13,184 $14,140 
District Energy and CHP $925 $1,189 $850 $925 
Water Heating $1,197 $1,357 $1,490 $1,639 
Lighting $9,992 $10,701 $22,024 $24,666 
Appliances and Electronic 
Equipment 
$148 $208 $227 $472 
Demand Response & 
Enabling IT 
$2,748 $2,748 $3,356 $3,431 
Total $39,315 $43,779 $57,747 $63,736 
 























































Residential Cost of Electricity
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Table 23: Variable Description – Covariates at DiD and SCM 
ESRCD: Electricity price in the residential sector - Dollars per million Btu 
GDPRX: Real gross domestic product. - Million chained (2009) dollars 
TEGDS: Energy expenditures as percent of current-dollar GDP - Percent 
TPOPP: Resident population including Armed Forces. - Thousand 
WYTCB: Wind energy, total consumed. - Billion Btu 
 
WYTXB: Wind energy, total end-use consumption. - Billion Btu 
 
CDD: Cooling degree days 
 
HDD: Heating degree days 
 
PRC_1unit: Percentage of housing structures with one unit 
 
PRC_20unit: Percentage of housing structures with 20 or more units 
 
PRC_1bdrm: Percentage of housing with one bedroom 
 
PRC_elche:  Percentage of housing with electrical heating  
 















% of 2015 
retail sales 
Rhode Island 222,822 2.91 
Massachusetts 1,472,536 2.74 
Vermont 110,642 2.01 
Maine 183,347 1.53 
Connecticut 435,740 1.48 
New York 1,559,665 1.05 
Pennsylvania 904,238 0.64 
New Hampshire  64,869 0.59 
New Jersey  409,957 0.55 
   
Source: AEEE The 2016 State Energy Efficiency Scorecard 
Table 25: Proved Reserves of Fossil Fuels 
 Crude Oil Natural Gas   
Year Billion (bbl) (Tcf) 
  
1980 641.85 2,585.68 
  
1985 701.49 3,401.25 
  
1990 1,002.27 3,980.89 
  
1995 1,000.62 4,981.45 
  
2000 1,018.18 5,149.96 
  
2005 1,278.45 6,044.93 
  
2010 1,356.69 6,638.19 
  
2015 1,657.95 6,950.51 
  
 




Table 26: Mean Value Comparison of the Treated and Synthetic control output  
 
RI Mean Annual Residential Electricity Consumption in MWh 
 
Year YRI Treated YRI Synthetic     
2005 7.4388719 7.428182     
2006 7.0356641 7.0929316     
2007 7.2916083 7.2541209     
2008 7.0735087 7.1193668     
2009 6.7963095 7.0001828     
2010 7.2402263 7.3370818     
2011 7.2368846 7.3503314     
2012 7.1681738 7.2487761     
2013 7.2220592 7.2473378     
2014 6.9958849 7.1093024     
2015 7.1230578 7.2184379     
 
 
Table 27: State Weights in the synthetic Rhode Island 
State Weight 
       CT 0 
       MA 0 
       NH 0 
       NJ 0.003 
       NY 0.252 
       PA 0.04 






Table 28: Residential electricity consumption predictor means before the LCP 
Predictor Treated Synthetic 
ln_price_elect 3.71726 3.71833 
ln_income 3.86127 3.82305 
ln_cdd 6.39757 5.83689 
ln_hdd 8.65696 8.8787 
prc_1unit 0.55071 0.59924 
prc_20unt 0.06901 0.08007 
prc_1bdrm 0.14501 0.13634 
prc_elche 0.07069 0.05159 
prc_occup 0.00208 0.00387 
ln_kwh_consumer(2007) 1.98672 1.98205 
ln_kwh_consumer(2006) 1.95099 1.96243 
ln_kwh_consumer(2005) 2.00672 2.00728 
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